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The Surprising Significance of De 
Minimis Tax Rules 
Leigh Osofsky* & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas** 
Abstract 
De minimis tax rules—rules that eliminate tax burdens for 
low-income taxpayers or low-dollar transactions—abound in the 
tax law. Despite the prevalence of such rules, legal scholarship 
has treated them as—well—de minimis, or as mere rounding 
errors that do not merit sustained attention. This perspective is 
understandable. If de minimis rules address insignificant 
taxpayers or tax liabilities, aren’t the rules themselves likely to 
be insignificant? 
Recent tax law developments have revealed that this 
conception of de minimis tax rules is deeply misguided. Major 
allocations of tax law liability, as well as accompanying 
questions about the fairness, efficiency, and administrability of 
the tax system, turn on the existence and design of de minimis 
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tax rules. In the wake of the recent Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, for 
example, astute industry players successfully lobbied the 
Treasury Department to create de minimis tax rules, thereby 
scoring significant monetary victories. De minimis tax rules like 
these not only serve as low-salience giveaways but are also poorly 
designed in a way that undermines the integrity of the tax 
system. 
The lack of scholarly attention to de minimis tax rules has 
left this lobbying largely unchecked. There is no scholarly 
framework evaluating existing de minimis tax rules. There is no 
policy framework to help lawmakers decide why, when, or how 
such rules should be made. And there is no separation of powers 
framework analyzing when the Treasury Department has the 
authority to create de minimis tax rules without express 
Congressional authorization. This Article seeks to fill this gap by 
analyzing de minimis tax rules along all of these dimensions. It 
provides a framework for considering when de minimis tax rules 
are preferable to other policy options and offers important design 
considerations. Scholars can apply this analysis to the de 
minimis tax rules that already pervade the Internal Revenue 
Code and policymakers can use it to guide the many more they 
will consider in the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The tax law purports to tax all income, from whatever 
source derived.1 But as students of the tax law quickly learn, 
that seemingly simple tenet gives way to numerous 
complications and exceptions. Imagine, for example, that your 
employer offers free coffee and pastries every Friday at the 
office. Technically, the snacks constitute “income” and, as such, 
should be taxable.2 But taxing an occasional croissant borders 
on the absurd. Must the employer keep track of how many 
pastries each employee eats? What about employees that don’t 
drink coffee? Does the payroll department have to process the 
value of the pastries and add it to the employee’s biweekly 
paycheck? Will the employee pay Social Security taxes on a 
portion of the coffee consumed? 
The answer to all of these questions is “no”—because the 
tax law treats the coffee and pastries as de minimis. Although 
noncash compensation paid to employees is generally taxable, 
the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) exempts any “de minimis 
fringe,” defined as property or services with a value so small “as 
to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively 
impracticable.”3 In other words, de minimis fringes are small 
benefits provided by an employer, like doughnuts in a company 
break room, that are so minor that they are not worth keeping 
track of for tax purposes.4 
De minimis rules abound in the tax law. Like the rule for 
de minimis fringes, many other de minimis rules exempt 
taxpayers from a tax burden when the revenue at stake is not 
worth the cost of complying with the law. Other de minimis tax 
rules exempt taxpayers from particularly complex tax regimes 
that are targeted at more sophisticated parties. For example, 
the new “pass-through deduction” enacted as part of sweeping 
tax reform in 2017 allows taxpayers below a certain income 
threshold to avoid some of its most complicated provisions.5 The 
 
 1.  I.R.C. § 61(a). 
 2. See id. § 61(a)(1) (stating that gross income includes any 
compensation for services including fringe benefits). 
 3. Id. § 132(a)(4), (e). 
 4. Id. § 132(e)(1). 
 5. See infra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
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Code and Treasury Regulations are replete with other examples 
of de minimis exceptions. 
Yet, despite their prevalence in the tax law, there is no 
scholarly framework for analyzing de minimis tax rules. While 
scholars have at times focused on particular de minimis tax 
rules,6 they have not more generally examined the phenomenon: 
Why do de minimis rules pervade the tax law? Why, when, and 
how should they be created? And which actors have the 
authority to create them? 
At first blush, this lack of scholarly attention makes sense. 
These are de minimis rules after all. Since de minimis rules 
exempt insignificant taxpayers or transactions from otherwise 
generally applicable law,7 scholars can be excused for thinking 
that the rules themselves are relatively insignificant—the 
equivalent of rounding errors in the design of the tax law. 
Application of a de minimis rule may help a particular taxpayer, 
the thought process would go, but comprehensively 
understanding de minimis rules may not seem like it is of 
particular importance to the tax system. But this conception is 
deeply misguided. As this Article will illustrate, while de 
minimis rules can serve an important role in the tax system, 
they are also subject to significant problems with systemic 
effects, which scholars and commentators have failed to 
recognize. 
This Article fills this gap in the literature. First, the Article 
surveys existing de minimis tax rules and the various functions 
of those rules. We find that most de minimis tax rules are 
 
 6. The de minimis fringe benefit rule has attracted particular attention. 
See, e.g., Susan C. Morse & Leigh Osofsky, Regulating by Example, 35 YALE J. 
ON REG. 127, 171–75 (2018) (exploring how Treasury has elaborated the 
meaning of de minimis fringe benefits, which are excluded from gross income). 
Another issue that has received some sustained focus is how to prevent states 
from imposing use or sales taxes on de minimis activity that occurs in the 
state. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., Rethinking State and Local Reliance 
on the Retail Sales Tax: Should We Fix the Sales Tax or Discard It?, 2000 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 77, 132–33 (exploring imposition of state use taxes for sales in 
excess of de minimis amounts); Adam B. Thimmesch, The Tax Hangover: 
Trailing Nexus, 33 VA. TAX REV. 497, 503–04 (2014) (proposing “a new 
trailing-nexus standard” that “protects against the retained jurisdiction over 
taxpayers with de minimis activity in a state”). 
 7. I.R.C. § 132(e)(1). 
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intended to reduce administrative and compliance costs for both 
taxpayers and the government when those costs are not justified 
by the revenue at stake. Some de minimis tax rules are aimed 
specifically at relieving taxpayers of compliance burdens like 
filling out tax forms (what we call “procedural de minimis tax 
rules”), while other de minimis tax rules are aimed at relieving 
taxpayers of substantive tax obligations (what we call 
“substantive de minimis tax rules”). De minimis tax rules may 
exempt taxpayers and transactions from relatively simple rules 
that impose high compliance burdens, or they may exempt 
taxpayers from complex tax regimes when such taxpayers lack 
sophistication. Finally, we find that some de minimis tax rules 
appear to be more motivated by political considerations than 
concerns about disproportionate compliance costs. 
Having surveyed the function of existing de minimis tax 
rules, we then turn to the drawbacks of such rules. We argue 
that de minimis tax rules impose a number of unappreciated 
costs on the tax system. First, by excepting out insignificant 
taxpayers or transactions, de minimis tax rules also enable the 
law that remains to be more burdensome than it otherwise 
would be. This increased burden in the generally applicable law 
has both efficiency and distributive implications. Second, de 
minimis tax rules, such as the exclusion for de minimis fringes, 
often fail to capture changes in industry and tax planning 
practices, undermining the rule’s administrative benefits and 
even supercharging inefficient tax planning. 
In addition to these costs, de minimis tax rules are also 
particularly prone to lobbying and may thus disproportionately 
benefit insiders. Indeed, recent events have driven this point 
home. At the end of 2017, Congress enacted the most sweeping 
tax reform in over thirty years.8 While the legislation was 
ambitious in scope, it left many fundamental design questions 
unanswered.9 The legislation thus opened the door for industry 
insiders to score even more victories than usual in the 
 
 8. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code). 
 9. Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Osofsky, Legislation and Comment: The Making 
of the Section 199A Regulations, 69 EMORY L.J. 209, 211 (2019). 
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administrative process.10 One way that insiders did so was by 
lobbying for more advantageous, underlying tax rules.11 But 
another way that such insiders did so was by arguing for de 
minimis exceptions to the tax rules themselves. By lobbying for, 
and getting, various de minimis tax rules, industry insiders 
quietly, but significantly, changed the reach of the legislation.12 
Finally, Congress clearly has the authority to craft 
statutory de minimis rules, but many also exist in Treasury 
regulations.13 We believe there is a strong argument that 
Treasury actually does not have the authority to create many of 
the regulatory de minimis tax rules that exist across the tax law. 
This point may have a critical impact on tax administration. 
Moreover, aside from questions of administrative authority, as 
the 2017 tax reform reveals, Treasury crafting de minimis tax 
rules can be problematic on political economy grounds. Creating 
de minimis tax rules in the administrative process is a 
particularly low salience way for industry insiders to gain 
significant victories, undermining the integrity of the tax 
system. 
These issues with de minimis tax rules do not mean they 
should be abandoned. Rather, policymakers should carefully 
weigh the benefits of each de minimis tax rule against its costs 
and consider whether a de minimis tax rule is preferable to 
using less formal administrative discretion. We provide a 
framework for making these evaluations and suggest particular 
considerations that should apply in specific contexts. Moreover, 
when policymakers do decide to adopt a de minimis tax rule, this 
Article offers important design considerations. Among other 
lessons, we explain that, based on our study, de minimis tax 
rules should be subject to particular scrutiny when they benefit 
sophisticated parties, they should be routinely evaluated for 
 
 10. See TCJA’s Business Tax Provisions: Design Flaws and Undemocratic 
Implementation: Hearing on the Disappearing Corporate Income Tax Before 
the H. Ways & Means Comm., 116th Cong. 3 (2020) (“This opened the door for 
taxpayers with resources to influence significant influence over the regulatory 
process, which lacks safeguards against such abuse.”). 
 11. See infra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 190–193 and accompanying text. 
 13. Nonenforcement of small violations is discussed separately infra Part 
IV.B. 
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change over time, and procedural de minimis tax rules should 
be more carefully crafted to minimize impacts on substantive 
tax law. 
At bottom, we argue that, far from being insignificant, de 
minimis rules play an important role in the design of the tax law 
and thus who bears the burdens and benefits of taxation. 
Indeed, the notion that de minimis tax rules are relatively 
insignificant serves only to perpetuate their proliferation. The 
result, paradoxically, is a series of rules that, precisely by 
professing to address insignificant taxpayers and transactions, 
together have a profound, but largely unexamined, effect on the 
tax system.14 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background 
on de minimis tax rules and the existing scholarly framework 
for such rules. Part II discusses de minimis tax rules in more 
detail; it describes the functions of different types of de minimis 
tax rules and illustrates these functions through a 
non-exhaustive survey of existing rules. Part III then turns to 
the drawbacks of de minimis tax rules, focusing particularly on 
the unintended costs imposed by such rules. Part IV explores 
when and how de minimis rules should be adopted, followed by 
a brief conclusion. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF DE MINIMIS TAX RULES 
A.  What Are De Minimis Tax Rules? 
De minimis tax rules exempt small taxpayers or small 
transactions from certain tax burdens. Perhaps the most 
well-known of such rules is the exclusion for de minimis fringe 
benefits under § 132 of the Internal Revenue Code.15 As 
discussed above, that rule exempts both employers and 
employees from having to keep records of and report small fringe 
 
 14. Cf. Alfred E. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, 
Imperfections, and the Limits of Economics, 19 KYKLOS 23, 23 (1966) 
(exploring, in the context of market economics, how a series of small, seemingly 
insignificant decisions, can yield large, undesirable effects). 
 15. I.R.C. § 132. 
DE MINIMIS TAX RULES 781 
 
benefits when the administrative burden of doing so does not 
appear to justify the cost.16 
Many de minimis tax rules carve out exceptions to tax 
regimes that are otherwise complex, often to protect less 
sophisticated parties from application of the complex rules. 
Consider, as an example, the rules for interest-free loans under 
Code § 7872. Imagine that a mother decides to give an 
interest-free loan to her child who has recently graduated from 
college. As a general rule, the tax law will pretend that the 
foregone interest on such a loan has been gifted to the borrower 
(the child) and repaid to the lender (the mother).17 This means 
that, under the general rule for so-called “below-market loans,” 
the mother’s generosity will actually generate a tax bill based 
on phantom interest payments.18 As callous as this seems, this 
is conceptually the right result. Without the rules, more 
sophisticated taxpayers could transfer value to others without 
the transfer being subject to taxation. For example, an employer 
might extend an interest free loan to its employee to provide 
compensation while avoiding employment taxes.19 The 
below-market loan rules serve as a guardrail against this 
potentially abusive tax planning.20 
However, even if the below-market loan rules make sense 
as an anti-abuse measure, they are far from intuitive. Many 
taxpayers cannot understand an imaginary transfer of foregone 
interest from the lender to the borrower, along with an 
imaginary payment of interest by the borrower back to the 
lender. And while the below-market loan rules might be 
necessary in certain circumstances to prevent overly clever tax 
planning, they are downright absurd as applied to others. 
Imagine the unenviable job of an accountant who has to explain 
to her client that the small loan made to a struggling adult child 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. § 7872. 
 18. Id. 
 19. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 
1984 528 (J. Comm. Print 1984) (1984 TRA Bluebook). 
 20. See id. (“Under prior law, a transaction structured as a loan and a 
payment in the nature of compensation often did not result in any tax 
consequences for either the lender or the borrower.”). 
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creates tax liability on foregone interest that the child 
imaginarily paid. 
To take such scenarios into account, de minimis rules 
exempt many small transactions from the below-market loan 
rules. For instance, interest is not imputed on gift loans between 
individuals if the loan doesn’t exceed $10,000.21 This de minimis 
rule, and others like it,22 except relatively insignificant 
taxpayers or transactions from the general tax law that would 
otherwise apply.23 
Other de minimis rules exempt taxpayers from reporting 
obligations, rather than substantive tax rules. For example, 
consider the $600 reporting threshold for Form 1099-MISC.24 
When businesses hire independent contractors to perform 
services, the business generally must issue a Form 1099 to the 
contractor and send a copy to the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS); this allows the IRS to ensure that the income gets 
properly reported on the contractor’s tax return.25 The 1099 
requirement is sensible but it is not without costs for the payor, 
who must collect tax information from the contractor and remit 
the forms.26 These administrative costs make the requirement 
harder to justify for small transactions; consider, for example, a 
one-time payment to a contractor of $25. Accordingly, a de 
minimis rule exempts payments from the 1099 requirement if 
 
 21. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2). The de minimis rule applies only if the aggregate 
of all loans between the individuals does not exceed $10,000. Id. It does not 
apply if the loan is used to purchase income-producing property, such as stock 
or bonds. Id. 
 22. Another de minimis rule provides that, for loans between individuals 
that do not exceed $100,000, imputed interest will not exceed the borrower’s 
net investment income for the year. Id. § 7872(d). Further, if the borrower’s 
net investment income is not over $1,000, the net investment income is treated 
as zero for purposes of § 7872. Id. § 7872(d)(1)(E)(ii). This is a sensible result: 
borrowers with minor amounts of investment income (less than $1,001) are 
entitled to ignore it for purposes of triggering imputed interest on loans that 
exceed the $10,000 de minimis threshold but do not exceed $100,000. 
 23. See id. § 7872(c)(2). 
 24. See id. § 6041(a). 
 25. Certain exceptions apply, such as payments made to a corporation. 
See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3(p)(1) (2006); infra Part II. 
 26. See infra Part II. 
DE MINIMIS TAX RULES 783 
 
the aggregate amount paid to the contractor is less than $600.27 
The $600 reporting threshold protects infrequent and low dollar 
transactions from a filing burden when neither the 
circumstances nor the tax revenue at issue seem to merit it. 
De minimis rules are often statutory, but can be found in 
Treasury regulations as well.28 Sometimes they are explicitly 
described as “de minimis” (as in the case of de minimis fringe 
benefits),29 and sometimes they function as de minimis without 
use of the moniker (as in the case of the $600 threshold for Form 
1099-MISC).30 Whether or not explicitly named as such, de 
minimis tax rules include all statutes or regulations in which 
Congress or Treasury has carved out a specific exemption from 
a stated tax rule for an insignificant transaction or taxpayer.31 
In most cases, the de minimis exemptions are defined by 
reference to a dollar threshold that measures either the size of 
the transaction (e.g., below-market loans under $10,000) or the 
income of the taxpayer. 
B.  Scholarly Framework 
Despite the pervasiveness and variety of de minimis tax 
rules, tax scholarship generally has not focused on them. There 
are thousands of practitioner-oriented articles explaining the 
details of particular de minimis tax rules.32 However, there is no 
broad-based, theoretical examination of de minimis tax rules or 
their role in the tax system.33 
 
 27. I.R.C. § 6041(a). 
 28. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.6721-1(c) (2014) (exempting 
“inconsequential errors or omissions” on information returns from penalties). 
 29. See id. § 1.132-6. 
 30. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-2 (2020). 
 31. Similar action can be taken through less formal administrative 
discretion (such as nonenforcement in certain situations). De minimis rules 
are compared to less formal administrative discretion in infra Part IV.B. 
 32. A search of “‘de minimis’ w/10 tax” on Westlaw on April 13, 2020 
produced 2,668 secondary sources. By and large they produced 
practitioner-oriented articles that discussed particular de minimis rules, 
generally in passing. 
 33. Limited articles attempt to draw any more general conclusions about 
de minimis tax rules. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation 
of Electronic Commerce: Reflections on the Emerging Issues, 52 U. MIA. L. REV. 
691, 719 (1998) (“Implementing any sensible tax regime for electronic 
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To be sure, de minimis tax rules do connect with a broader 
literature about how legal commands can be calibrated. This 
literature suggests that not just the underlying legal content, 
but also the form of that legal content takes, matters.34 For 
instance, a legislature may wish to ban a certain type of 
pollution. How this ban is crafted in legal terms will be 
consequential. Early, canonical work suggested that such a ban 
may be more rule-like or standard-like, with rules determining 
legal content ex ante and standards determining such content 
ex post.35 Under this framework, if the pollution is likely to be a 
routine problem, rules are preferable, whereas if the pollution is 
likely to be a variable issue, a standard may be preferable.36 
The “rules/standards” literature is extensive, with many 
nuances. Many have suggested a wide variety of implications of 
rules versus standards. For instance, rules allocate more 
decision-making power to the rule-maker, whereas standards 
allocate more decision-making power to the adjudicator or 
enforcer.37 Precise rules and vague standards also may have 
different impacts on compliance.38 Or the two may be used 
 
commerce would be facilitated by adopting de minimis safe harbor rules to 
protect small vendors and to assure that the compliance costs do not exceed 
the tax revenues at stake.”); Aaron Hsieh, Note, The Faceless Coin: Achieving 
a Modern Tax Policy in the Changing Landscape of Cryptocurrency, 2019 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1079, 1094–100 (asking how the existence of de minimis tax rules 
should impact the taxation of cryptocurrency). 
 34. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687 (1976) (“[T]he choice between 
standards and rules of different degrees of generality is significant, and can be 
analyzed in isolation from the substantive issues that the rules or standards 
respond to.”). 
 35. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, 559–60 (1992). 
 36. See id. at 621–22 (“The central factor influencing the desirability of 
rules and standards is the frequency with which a law will govern conduct.”). 
 37. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 159 (1991); Adrian 
Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 93 (2000) (“Rules thus 
require more information and decisional competence ex ante, at the time the 
rule formulators decide what the content of the rule should be. Standards 
require more information and decisional competence ex post, at the time of 
application.”). 
 38. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 
YALE L.J. 65, 73 (1983) (stating that rate of compliance is one of the “principal 
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together, with background standards, such as anti-abuse 
standards, reducing the need for rules to be more complex to 
address uncommon transactions.39 Some scholars have sought 
to move beyond the rules/standards dichotomy entirely, 
exploring how many hybrid forms of legal commands play an 
important role in the legal system.40 
Just like rules, standards, and other rule/standard hybrids, 
de minimis rules are one way to fit an underlying legal command 
to particular situations. As already described, de minimis rules 
fill this function throughout the tax system by excepting out 
insignificant taxpayers or transactions from rules of general 
applicability. In this way, de minimis tax rules can be seen as a 
sort of rulification of exceptions that could otherwise take more 
ad hoc, or less tailored, forms. 
The fact that de minimis tax rules overlap with other 
possibilities may help explain why scholars have not focused on 
de minimis tax rules in particular. As one possibility, in lieu of 
an official de minimis tax rule, the government may reach a 
similar result through nonenforcement of the law in 
circumstances it deems to be de minimis.41 For example, there 
is no de minimis rule that says small cash prizes do not need to 
be reported as income. However, it seems unlikely that the IRS 
would pursue and penalize someone who didn’t report a prize of, 
say, $50. 
Other formally adopted rules, like safe harbors, look similar 
to de minimis rules in other ways. A safe harbor is a 
rule/standard hybrid that provides “safety” to taxpayers who fit 
within its boundaries, without deciding the law for taxpayers 
 
subcategories of potential costs and benefits” of the degree of care with which 
a rule is articulated). 
 39. David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 
870–72 (1999) (explaining the means by which standards and rules can be used 
simultaneously to avoid unnecessary complexity). 
 40. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 165, 165 (2015) (exploring the law’s use of catalogs). 
 41. For a discussion of nonenforcement as a tax law tool, see generally 
Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 TAX L. REV. 73 
(2015). 
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who do not.42 Like nonenforcement, safe harbors have some 
similarities to de minimis rules because they may apply to small 
transactions.43 However, safe harbors are distinct from de 
minimis rules because their principal function is providing 
certainty regarding how ambiguous law will apply in certain 
circumstances, not exempting transactions from generally 
applicable law on the basis of relative insignificance.44 For 
example, under one safe harbor, taxpayers who pay quarterly 
estimated taxes equal to 100 percent of their prior year’s tax 
liability can be assured they will not owe late payment penalties 
if they owe additional tax with their tax return, regardless of 
how much additional tax they owe.45 
Recently, tax scholarship has abstracted away from 
particular design tools, in order to consider how the law, in 
many ways, may except certain parties. For instance, recent 
scholarship has emphasized that there are many forms of 
informal leeway that result in nonapplication of the law, and 
has discussed how data is likely to affect all of these forms of 
leeway.46 Other important work is focusing broadly on the 
problem of IRS inaction and its deregulatory consequences.47 
This work, which analyzes the many offramps to the application 
of the tax law, helps conceptualize the extent to which the 
general tax law actually applies, to whom, and under what 
circumstances.48 
 
 42. See Susan C. Morse, Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1385, 1387, 1391 (2016); Emily Cauble, Safe Harbors in Tax Law, 47 
CONN. L. REV. 1385, 1387–88 (2015). 
 43. See Morse, supra note 42, at 1402 (providing an example of a safe 
harbor applying to a “cup-of-coffee” worth less than ten dollars). 
 44. See Cauble, supra note 42, at 1399 (“A safe harbor reduces risk and 
ambiguity for taxpayers who operate within the safe harbor’s parameters.”). 
 45. See I.R.C. § 6654(d)(1)(B). Taxpayers over an income threshold must 
pay 110 percent of their prior year’s tax penalty to avoid a penalty. See id. 
§ 6654(d)(1)(C)(ii). 
 46. Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Falling Short in the Digital Age 11–20 
(June 12, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 47. See generally Brian Galle & Stephen Shay, Administrative Law and 
the Crisis of Tax Administration (July 3, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with authors). 
 48. See id. at 2–4. 
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This Article stands for the proposition that how exceptions 
are created matters as well.49 The fact that there are many 
potential ways to create exceptions in the law makes each tool 
no less important. Rather, given the existence of other options, 
the choice to use a particular tool becomes even more significant. 
We believe that de minimis tax rules merit particular attention 
because they both legitimize ignoring insignificant transactions 
through the official sanction of a statute or regulation, while at 
the same time, they appear to justify the exceptions through a 
claim of insignificance. We argue that this dual facet of de 
minimis tax rules: their formal entrenchment, combined with 
the sense of their insignificance, has far-reaching consequences 
well beyond the insignificant transactions the rules purport to 
address. Essentially, the use of this widespread tax exception 
tool largely flies under the radar of scholarly attention, at the 
same time as its pervasiveness across the tax system yields 
widespread effects. 
II.  THE ROLE OF DE MINIMIS TAX RULES 
The notion that de minimis tax rules are insignificant is 
belied by their pervasiveness across the tax law. As this Part 
explores, de minimis tax rules exist in a number of different 
types and serve numerous different functions, under the general 
umbrella of exempting out insignificant taxpayers and 
transactions. Indeed, the multiplicity and variety of de minimis 
rules across the tax law suggest that, far from inconsequential 
exceptions, these exceptions are, in some ways, the rule. 
A.  Substantive/Procedural De Minimis Tax Rules 
De minimis tax rules come in a variety of different types. 
Paradigmatically, it is easiest to think of de minimis tax rules 
as exempting insignificant taxpayers and transactions from the 
 
 49. Cf. Stephen E. Shay, A GILTI High-Tax Exclusion Election Would 
Erode the U.S. Tax Base, 165 TAX NOTES FED. 1129, 1145 (2019) (arguing that 
many important decisions, such as the role of the tax system in facilitating 
income inequality, in fact arise from a series of low-salience, seemingly merely 
technical decisions, like the reach of certain international tax regulations). 
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burdens of the tax law.50 What we refer to as “substantive de 
minimis tax rules” do this most clearly by exempting taxpayers 
from substantive (and possibly procedural) tax obligations, often 
if a transaction is below a certain dollar threshold or, less 
commonly, if the taxpayer’s income is below a certain amount. 
For example, a substantive de minimis tax rule provides that 
gifts to an individual under $15,000 are not subject to gift tax or 
the accompanying gift tax return obligation.51 This rule ensures 
that modest giftspicture a grandparent gifting his or her 
grandchild $100 at graduationdo not trigger burdensome tax 
and reporting requirements on the part of the donor. If a gift 
qualifies for this substantive de minimis tax rule, the taxpayer 
is relieved of all tax law burdensboth procedural and 
substantivethat would otherwise be associated with the gift.52 
While substantive de minimis tax rules may be the norm, 
there is another type of de minimis tax rule that pervades the 
law as well. These rules, which we refer to as “procedural de 
minimis tax rules,” relieve taxpayers only of the procedural, but 
not substantive, burdens of the tax law. Consider again the $600 
threshold for filing Form 1099-MISC. For a taxpayer without a 
payroll administrator or an automated payroll system, filing a 
1099-MISC may be time consuming and complicated. The payor 
must collect tax identification and other personal information 
from the payee on a Form W-9,53 and must remit the 1099 Form 
at the end of the year to both the payee and the IRS.54 Even for 
taxpayers with sophisticated payroll systems already in place, 
 
 50. See I.R.C. § 132 (e)(1) (defining fringe benefits as property or services 
with a value “so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or 
administratively impracticable”). 
 51. See id. § 2503 (establishing the gift exclusion, subject to inflation 
adjustments); id. § 6019 (stating that gifts excluded under § 6019 are exempt 
from the gift tax return requirement). The gift tax exclusion is adjusted 
annually for inflation; $15,000 is the limit for 2020. See Rev. Proc. 2019-44, 
2019-47 I.R.B. 1100 (stating that the amount of the annual exclusion is 
$15,000 for calendar year 2020). 
 52. See I.R.C. § 6019(1) (exempting transfers below the annual exclusion 
amount from reporting requirements). 
 53. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REQUESTER OF FORM 
W-9 2 (2018), https://perma.cc/227W-KETP (PDF). 
 54. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1099-MISC AND 
FORM 1099-NEC 4 (2020), https://perma.cc/6C49-EUFA (PDF). 
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the administrative costs of gathering tax information from a 
single payee for a one-off transaction might not justify the cost, 
especially for low dollar, non-recurring transactions.55 The $600 
de minimis threshold for Form 1099-MISC alleviates this 
reporting obligation for such transactions.56 However, by 
nature, such rules are not supposed to change the substantive 
tax liability of the payee.57 As an example, imagine that a lawyer 
pays a gardener $300 to perform a one time job, and assume the 
gardener’s marginal tax rate is 20 percent. The gardener has 
$300 of income and $60 of tax liability as a result of the 
payment, notwithstanding the fact that the $600 de minimis 
threshold relieves the lawyer of the obligation to issue a Form 
1099-MISC.58 Indeed, since procedural de minimis tax rules like 
this one do not purport to change the substantive tax law, they 
seem like a can’t lose proposition: they reduce administrative 
costs, without reducing revenue owed.59 
Most other information reporting rules in the Code also 
have procedural de minimis exemptions. Rules for payments 
made by certain third party intermediaries are subject to an 
even larger de minimis threshold than the $600 threshold for 
Form 1099-MISC. Specifically, if a payment is made through an 
online intermediary like PayPal, the intermediary must issue a 
1099-K to the payee only when the aggregate payments to the 
payee exceed both $20,000 and two hundred transactions during 
the year.60 It is unclear what the justification for such a high de 
minimis threshold is in the context of Form 1099-K and third 
party intermediaries. It is possible that Congress did not want 
to overburden online intermediaries like PayPal that facilitate 
payments with large volumes of customers; the higher threshold 
 
 55. See id. at 17 (setting forth the instructions for filing form 
1099-MISC). 
 56. I.R.C. § 6041(a). 
 57. However, as discussed further infra Part III.B.1, procedural de 
minimis tax rules may create de facto substantive law. 
 58. See I.R.C. § 61 (“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross 
income means all income from whatever source derived, 
including . . . [c]ompensation for services . . . .”). 
 59. But see infra Part III.B.1, for problems presented by procedural de 
minimis tax rules. 
 60. I.R.C. § 6050W(e). 
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reduces the reporting burden. However, as discussed further 
below, Congress may have failed to anticipate the scope of the 
$20,000 de minimis threshold given the prevalence of 
transactions that take place through online platforms.61 
Other information reporting rules have much lower 
procedural de minimis thresholds. For example, a Form 
1099-INT is required to be issued when a payee’s interest 
income is at least $10 in the aggregate.62 Similarly, a Form 
1099-DIV is required whenever dividend income is at least 
$10.63 These much lower thresholds appear justifiable to the 
extent the payors are most likely to be financial institutions 
with the scale to issue information returns on an inexpensive 
basis. 
Although payors are subject to penalties if they fail to file 
required information returns,64 de minimis rules apply in this 
context, too. Specifically, payors can avoid penalties if the 
failure is corrected and if the missed or inaccurate returns do 
not exceed the greater of ten information returns; or 1/2 of 1 
percent of the total number of required information returns for 
that year.65 
Another example of procedural de minimis rules is the 
substantiation requirement for deducting charitable 
contributions, which requires taxpayers to obtain a written 
acknowledgement from the donee organization in order to 
deduct any contribution of $250 or more.66 Like with the 
above-mentioned rules, this procedural de minimis rule does not 
change the underlying tax law. Taxpayers can only take 
charitable deductions that comply with all the requirements in 
the Code.67 But this procedural de minimis rule does change who 
 
 61. See infra notes 146156 and accompanying text; see also Kathleen 
DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415, 143637 
(2018) (arguing that Congress did not contemplate the pervasiveness of 
internet platform transactions when it enacted the de minimis threshold). 
 62. I.R.C. § 6049(a). 
 63. Id. § 6042(a). 
 64. See id. § 6721 (subjecting failures to file to “a penalty of $250 for each 
return with respect to which such a failure occurs”). 
 65. Id. § 6721(c)(1)(2). 
 66. Id. § 170(f)(8). 
 67. See id. § 170. 
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bears the burden of administrative requirements that are 
designed to help the IRS enforce the substantive law embedded 
in the Code.68 
B.  Different Functions of De Minimis Tax Rules 
Whether substantive or procedural, de minimis tax rules 
serve a variety of functions, under the general umbrella function 
of exempting out insignificant taxpayers and transactions. To 
some extent, these exemptions are designed to reduce inordinate 
costs to taxpayers. To some extent, they are designed to reduce 
inordinate costs to the government. And to some extent, de 
minimis tax rules seem to serve political functions that do not 
seem principally motivated by cost reduction. 
1.  Reducing Inordinate Costs to Taxpayers 
a.  Rules That Apply to Very Low Stakes Scenarios 
Some de minimis rules are designed to eliminate tax 
burdens in very low stakes scenarios. For instance, the gift tax 
rules allow taxpayers of any income or sophistication level to 
avoid both substantive gift tax liability and the procedural 
requirements of filling out a gift tax return when the transaction 
is a low dollar amount.69 Several other de minimis rules work 
the same way. For example, individuals who earn less than $400 
in net self-employment income do not have to pay 
self-employment taxes or file a Schedule SE with their tax 
return.70 Nor does a homeowner who pays a household employee 
less than $2,200 during the year have to report and pay 
employment taxes.71 These rules generally recognize that, when 
small amounts of tax revenue are at stake, the administrative 
costs of reporting certain taxes are not justified. This is 
particularly true for taxes that aren’t included in the ordinary 
 
 68. See id. § 170(f)(8) (placing the burden on the taxpayer). 
 69. See id. § 2503. 
 70. Id. § 1402(b)(2); see Instructions for Schedule SE (2019), INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., https://perma.cc/7G83-4PXZ (last updated July 18, 2020) 
(explaining when a Schedule SE must be filed). 
 71. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 926, HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYERS 
TAX GUIDE 2 (2020), https://perma.cc/43C6-ZJ6T (PDF). 
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course of preparing an individual’s income tax return. In other 
words, it’s not overly burdensome to ask a taxpayer to report an 
additional $50 of prize income on their tax return when they 
must already file the return and report other sources of income. 
But it does impose significant costs to require an individual to 
file an additional schedule or a different return, and possibly 
learn a different set of rules (like calculating household 
employment tax). 
b.  Rules that Protect Unsophisticated Parties from Complex 
Tax Regimes 
Another specific function of de minimis tax rules is 
preventing unsophisticated taxpayers from inadvertently being 
subject to a complex tax regime, such as the rules for 
below-market loans. As discussed above in the example of the 
mother making a small interest free loan to her adult child, 
complex rules designed to prevent abuse make little sense when 
applied to small, non-abusive transactions.72 Based on this 
function of de minimis tax rules, we would expect to see higher 
de minimis exemptions for more complex regimes. For example, 
the relatively low $400 threshold for triggering a 
self-employment tax obligation might reflect the idea that, 
although paying self-employment tax does impose additional 
administrative costs, it is not an overly complex regime. By way 
of contrast, the rules for imputing interest on below-market 
loans are highly complex, and a higher de minimis threshold of 
$10,000 seems appropriate. 
Another example of a rule that exempts small and 
potentially unsophisticated taxpayers from highly complex rules 
is the statutory de minimis rule found in § 199A of the Code. 
Section 199A provides a deduction of up to 20 percent of the 
qualified business income of certain pass-through businesses, 
such as partnerships or S corporations.73 For larger businesses, 
the deduction does not apply to taxpayers who work in a 
“specified service trade or business” (“SSTB”), which includes 
industries like law, health, accounting, and actuarial sciences, 
 
 72. See supra Part I.A. 
 73. I.R.C. § 199A(a). 
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among others.74 The deduction is also limited to a percentage of 
wages the taxpayer pays to employees or to a certain percentage 
of depreciable property the taxpayer holds.75 However, a de 
minimis rule in the statute provides that taxpayers below a 
certain threshold of taxable income (adjusted annually for 
inflation) can claim the deduction without regard to whether 
they are in an SSTB and without regard to the wage and 
depreciable property limitations.76 For 2020, the de minimis 
threshold begins at $163,300 for single taxpayers and $326,600 
for taxpayers who are married filing jointly.77 The effect of the 
rule is to exempt “small” taxpayers (measured by income) from 
the immense complexity of the 199A limitations.78 This would 
mean, for example, a self-employed plumber earning $100,000 
per year wouldn’t have to decide if his business was an SSTB 
and wouldn’t have to calculate a limitation based on wages paid 
or depreciable property. This exemption makes sense because 
the amount of the deduction claimed by a lower-income taxpayer 
will necessarily be modest79 and the complexity of the 199A 
rules would likely impose disproportionate costs on lower 
income taxpayers with lower ability to manage the complexity. 
c.  Rules that Shield Both Sophisticated and Unsophisticated 
Parties from Complex Tax Regimes 
Other de minimis rules provide exemptions for small 
transactions even when the rule might benefit sophisticated 
parties. Consider, for example, the de minimis rules for 
reporting original issue discount (“OID”). In general, OID arises 
when a debt instrument pays more at maturity than the original 
 
 74. Id. § 199A(d). 
 75. Id. § 199A(b)(2). 
 76. Id. § 199A(b)(3)(A), (e)(2) 
 77. Rev. Proc. 2019-44, 2019-47 I.R.B. 1099. For taxpayers over the de 
minimis threshold, the deduction phases out until the taxpayer exceeds the 
threshold by $50,000 ($100,000 for married filing jointly). I.R.C. 
§ 199A(b)(3)(B). 
 78. See Rev. Proc. 2019-44, 2019-47 I.R.B. 1099. 
 79. The deduction will generally be no more than 20 percent of the 
taxpayer’s taxable income. I.R.C. § 199A(a). 
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face amount of the debt.80 Whereas the gift loan scenario 
typically involves parties offering interest-free loans because 
they are not acting at arm’s length, the OID rules apply to 
scenarios where parties may collude to defer interest income 
until maturity.81 For example, an interest-free bond that was 
issued for $1,000 but pays $1,200 at maturity has $200 of OID, 
measured by the difference between the issue price and 
maturity price. The tax laws treat the OID as interest income to 
the lender (i.e., the bondholder) that must be spread out over the 
term of the debt instrument.82 OID treatment is generally not 
favorable because lenders must report interest income before 
they have actually received the interest.83 In the preceding 
example, the extra $200 payable at maturity is likely meant to 
compensate the bondholder (lender) for the interest-free aspect 
of the loan, but the bondholder must report the $200 in 
increments as if she had received interest payments. This 
results in phantom interest income, much like the below-market 
loan scenario. 
Like the rules for below-market loans, calculating and 
reporting OID is complicated, and the Code provides de minimis 
rules. First, the OID rules don’t apply to loans of $10,000 or less 
made between individuals.84 Second, if the OID on any loan is 
below a certain amount (which varies by the size and term of the 
loan), it is treated as zero, which means it does not have to be 
accrued over time as interest income.85 Instead, the lender can 
report the interest at the loan’s maturity, generally as capital 
gain.86 
The OID de minimis thresholds function slightly differently 
than the gift loan rules and the 199A de minimis threshold. 
 
 80. Id. § 1273(a)(1). Interest must be as high as the applicable Federal 
rate to be considered adequate. Id. § 1274(b). 
 81. See id. § 1273(b)(1). 
 82. Id. § 1272(a)(1). 
 83. Id. § 1272. 
 84. Id. § 1272(a)(2)(D). The loan must not be a trade or business loan and 
must not have a principal purpose of tax avoidance for the rule to apply. Id. 
 85. Id. § 1273(a)(3). The de minimis threshold is calculated as: 0.0025 x 
the stated redemption price at maturity x the number of years to maturity. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2012). 
 86. Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(d)(5)(ii)(A) (as amended in 2012). 
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Because OID is less likely to arise in everyday transactions (like 
an intra-family gift loan or earning business income as a sole 
proprietor), an unsophisticated taxpayer is less likely to become 
subject to the OID rules inadvertently.87 Further, even 
individual investors who are deemed to receive OID will likely 
receive information returns reporting it,88 and thus will not be 
burdened by the complexity of calculating it (which generally 
falls on the borrower/issuer89). The de minimis rules in this 
context are likely aimed at exempting parties from the 
complexity of calculating and reporting OID when little tax 
revenue is at stake, regardless of the sophistication of the 
parties. The revenue stakes are particularly relevant because 
OID is largely about timing, so the tax revenue will be based on 
the time value of money for modest amounts of interest.90 On 
the other hand, the administrative costs of imputing interest 
may be high in comparison, even for sophisticated parties.91 
Other de minimis rules similarly exempt parties from tax 
burdens when the tax regime is complex and the tax revenue is 
small by comparison, even when the party benefitted is possibly 
high income and/or sophisticated. For example, we might 
assume that taxpayers who can afford vacation homes can also 
afford the tax preparation assistance to properly report income 
and expenses when they use the home for a mix of personal and 
rental purposes. For taxpayers who split their homes between 
personal use and rental use, the Code requires bifurcation of 
 
 87. See Treas. Reg. § 1.108(i)-3(a) (as amended in 2013). 
 88. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1099-OID 5 (2019), https://
perma.cc/RA5R-L2L8 (PDF). 
 89. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORMS 1099-INT AND 
1099-OID 5 (2021), https://perma.cc/D2JD-ZCB9 (PDF). 
 90. See I.R.C. § 1272 (stating that gross income includes “an amount 
equal to the sum of the daily portions of the original issue discount for each 
day during the taxable year on which such holder held such debt instrument”). 
 91. Of course, the below-market loan de minimis rules may apply to 
sophisticated parties, as well. We do not suggest that different de minimis 
rules can neatly be placed in separate categories or do not have overlapping 
functions, but rather intend this discussion simply to illustrate a range of 
functions that de minimis rules serve. Also, see infra discussion accompanying 
notes 176179 for a critique of OID de minimis exceptions. 
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expenses according to the length of time used for each purpose.92 
However, a de minimis rule in § 280A provides that for 
taxpayers who rent their vacation home for less than fifteen 
days during the year, the rental use can be disregarded.93 This 
means that the rental income need not be reported (regardless 
of amount), nor can any expenses be claimed. This allows 
taxpayers who use their vacation homes primarily for personal 
purposes, and who rent their homes for only a small portion of 
the year, to avoid the administrative hassle of tracking expenses 
that are otherwise nondeductible. 
De minimis rules that allow taxpayers to deduct rather 
than capitalize certain business assets similarly seek to avoid 
administrative hassle in low stakes scenarios, even though the 
taxpayers are often sophisticated. Capitalizing the cost of 
business assets creates administrative complexity for taxpayers 
because they must calculate and report annual depreciation 
deductions on an asset-by-asset basis.94 Regulations under § 263 
allow taxpayers to deduct the cost of certain tangible business 
assets that meet a de minimis test.95 Specifically, the rule 
provides that taxpayers can elect to deduct the cost of any 
individual item that costs $5,000 or less.96 Taxpayers who do not 
have publicly filed or independently certified financial 
statements are limited to items that cost $2,500 or less.97 
 
 92. Taxpayers that use their vacation rentals for personal purposes for a 
significant portion of the year can only deduct property expenses to the extent 
of their rental income. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5). However, taxpayers that use the 
property primarily for rental income may qualify as a “business” and be able 
to deduct expenses in excess of rental income. Id. § 280A(c). 
 93. Id. § 280A(g). 
 94. See id. § 168. 
 95. When taxpayers acquire new property for their business or for 
investment purposes, § 263 of the Code generally requires them to capitalize 
the cost of the property, rather than deducting it. See id. § 263. 
 96. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(f) (as amended in 2014). Certain limitations 
apply; for example, the safe harbor does not apply to the purchase of inventory 
or land. Id. § 1.263(a)-1(f)(2). The rule applies regardless of the aggregate cost 
of such items. Id. This means a taxpayer who purchases 100 small machines 
that cost $5,000 each could deduct $500,000 as a business expense. 
 97. Id. § 1.263(a)-1(f)(1)(ii). The regulations provide a ceiling of $500 “or 
other amount as identified in published guidance,” and the IRS has raised that 
ceiling to $2,500 in Notice 2015-82. See I.R.S. Notice 15-82, 2015-50 I.R.B. 859. 
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d.  Rules that Benefit Sophisticated Parties in Relatively Low 
Stakes Scenarios 
Finally, some de minimis rules are clearly intended to 
address sophisticated taxpayers who voluntarily undertake 
complex transactions. In these cases, Congress (or Treasury) 
may still concede that a complex or stringent rule should not be 
applied to a low-stakes scenario. These rules often have more 
generous de minimis thresholds, which may seem high in 
isolation but aim to exempt transactions that are modest on a 
relative scale. For example, a de minimis rule exists for real 
estate investment trusts (“REIT”s), which allow individuals to 
invest in a pool of real estate assets through a specialized 
corporation.98 REITs generally are not taxed at the entity level 
provided they meet specific requirements under the Code,99 
including distributing most of their income to investors and 
investing mostly in real estate.100 Among other stringent 
investment requirements, at least 75 percent of a REIT’s assets 
must be real estate, cash, or government securities;101 further, 
not more than 5 percent of the REIT’s assets can be made up of 
securities of one issuer and the REIT cannot own more than 10 
percent of any one issuer.102 Although REITs generally must 
continually meet these requirements to avoid disqualification 
and an entity-level tax, the Code allows for de minimis 
infractions of the 5 percent and 10 percent rules without 
consequences.103 Specifically, if the value of the disqualifying 
assets does not exceed the lesser of 1 percent of the REIT’s total 
assets or $10 million, the REIT can correct the failure and avoid 
 
 98. I.R.C. § 856. 
 99. REITs are not technically pass-through entities but, rather, can 
deduct all dividends paid to investors for federal income tax purposes. Id. 
§ 857(b)(2)(B). 
 100. Id. §§ 856(c), 857(a). 
 101. Id. § 856(c)(4). Additionally, REITs must distribute 90 percent of their 
income each year to investors, at least 75 percent of their income must come 
from things like rent (and other real estate-related sources), and 95 percent of 
their income must be passive investment income (e.g., interest or dividends). 
Id. § 857(a)(1), (c)(3)(4). 
 102. Id. § 857(c)(4)(B). 
 103. Id. § 856(c)(7)(B). 
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a penalty.104 These rules give managers some leeway for 
inadvertent missteps that may be perhaps due to the changing 
nature of the company’s investments. 
A de minimis rule also exists under Code § 382, which 
generally limits a corporation’s ability to claim net operating 
losses after a change in ownership.105 For example, a profitable 
corporation cannot acquire an insolvent corporation and 
immediately claim all of the acquired corporation’s losses 
against its operating income to avoid tax.106 The statute 
provides a complex set of rules for calculating allowable losses 
and gains in various circumstances after an ownership 
change.107 Some of these rules involve how to treat assets with 
built-in gains or losses (i.e., where the fair market value of the 
asset is either greater or less than the asset’s basis).108 A de 
minimis rule in § 382(h) allows built-in gain or loss to be 
disregarded—treated as zerowhen the amount of built in gain 
or loss is not more than the lesser of $10 million or 15 percent of 
the total fair market value of the corporation’s assets.109 
Although the parties who are subject to § 382 have already 
taken on transaction costs and tax complexity by virtue of the 
change in ownership transaction, this de minimis rule exempts 
transactions that are “small” on a relative scale from some of the 
more onerous and burdensome parts of the statute. 
2.  Reducing Inordinate Costs to the Government 
The government is also a beneficiary of de minimis tax rules 
in several respects. First, the IRS clearly avoids administrative 
and enforcement costs when a rule exempts small transactions, 
 
 104. Id. § 856(c)(7). The failure must be due to reasonable cause and not 
willful neglect, and the disqualifying assets must be disposed of within six 
months. Id. Non de minimis failures can also be cured in the six-month time 
period but will subject the REIT to a financial penalty. Id. 
 105. See id. § 382(h)(B) (stating that losses are limited “in the same 
manner as if such loss were a pre-change loss” and by the amount of “net 
unrealized built-in loss, reduced by recognized built-in losses for prior taxable 
years”). 
 106. See id. § 382(b). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. § 382(h). 
 109. Id. § 382(h)(3)(B). 
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particularly if those transactions are frequent. For example, not 
requiring a gift tax return every time Grandma sends a $100 
check to Grandson means the IRS does not have to process 
millions of extra gift tax returns each year, and does not have to 
monitor whether taxpayers are complying with the rules for 
reporting gifts.110 Similarly, the IRS does not have to expend 
resources to audit and potentially initiate enforcement activities 
against taxpayers for violations of requirements like the 
requirement to report imputed interest on small below-market 
loans or the requirement to report rental income on a few days 
of renting a vacation home. Since relatively small de minimis 
thresholds ensure only modest tax revenue is at stake, audit and 
enforcement would likely be unjustified in those cases, in the 
same way that taxpayer compliance costs are likely unjustified. 
The same logic also applies to higher de minimis thresholds 
that apply to more sophisticated transactions and parties. For 
example, even though more revenue may be at stake in the 
context of § 382’s de minimis rule for built in gain and loss, the 
complexity of § 382 likely means more IRS enforcement costs are 
also at stake, and the tradeoff of a higher de minimis threshold 
may make sense.111 
3.  Political Economy 
Finally, some de minimis rules no doubt come about due to 
rent-seeking, political pressure, or public perception about the 
tax law. Such rules may be appropriately motivated by a 
cost-benefit tradeoff, or they may fail to accomplish the various 
roles discussed above. 
One relatively benign example is the exclusion for de 
minimis fringe benefits.112 As discussed above, the purpose of 
the rule is to exclude small fringe benefits from income when the 
administrative cost of valuing them is not worth the revenue at 
stake. This cost-based justification was likely mixed with a more 
political one: Congress in part enacted the rule to prevent the 
 
 110. See id. § 6019. 
 111. See id. § 382 (stating that the loss may not be deducted if it exceeds 
“the value of the old loss corporation, multiplied by the long-term tax-exempt 
rate”). 
 112. See id. § 132(a). 
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perception that the IRS is willing to tax the small pleasures in 
life.113 In other words, it may be feasible in practice for 
employers to value weekly doughnuts in the breakroom and 
report a small amount of additional income on their employees’ 
Form W-2.114 But taxing people on their free doughnuts may just 
be a step too far, and may engender negative views about the 
tax system and the IRS.115 
Perhaps a less benign example is the “small business” 
exemption from the accrual method accounting requirements. 
Although individual taxpayers can elect between the cash 
method and accrual method of accounting, the tax law generally 
requires corporations (and certain partnerships) to report on the 
accrual method.116 The accrual method is generally more 
accurate but also requires more compliance costs on the part of 
the taxpayer.117 Notwithstanding the general requirement that 
corporations use the accrual method, a de minimis rule in § 448 
allows smaller corporations to use the cash method.118 Until 
recently, the de minimis threshold was $5 million in gross 
receipts;119 this reflected the idea that corporations earning less 
than $5 million are smaller in scale and should not have to 
undergo the added complexity of accrual method accounting. 
Relatedly, with fewer than $5 million in gross receipts, the tax 
 
 113. See Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Revisiting the 
Taxation of Fringe Benefits, 91 WASH. L. REV. 761, 76263 (2016) (listing the 
reasons Congress enacted § 132(a)). 
 114. See id. at 810 (discussing the feasibility of taxing certain fringe 
benefits with modern technologies). 
 115. See id. at 788, 810 (discussing strong public support for not taxing 
employee perks). 
 116. See I.R.C. § 448(a) (prohibiting C corporations, partnerships with a C 
corporation partner, and tax shelters from using the cash receipts and 
disbursements method of accounting in computing taxable income). 
 117. See Chizoba Morah, Accrual Accounting vs. Cash Basis Accounting: 
What’s the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://perma.cc/4D5L-TMAZ (last 
updated Mar. 7, 2020). 
 118. I.R.C. § 448(c). 
 119. Colleen M. O’Connor et al., Tax Accounting for Businesses After the 
TCJA: Some Widely Applicable and Lesser-Known Changes, TAX ADVISOR 
(June 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/8QH8-YSJ6. 
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revenue at stake would be modest.120 However, 2017 tax 
reform—the so-called “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” (TCJA)—raised 
the de minimis threshold from $5 million to $25 million in gross 
receipts.121 This means that corporations with gross receipts 
under $25 million are now eligible to report on the cash method, 
allowing for favorable income deferral.122 The $25 million rule 
extends to other accounting rules, as well, allowing corporations 
that fall under the threshold to deduct rather than capitalize 
certain costs123 and to avoid less favorable accounting methods 
that apply to specific situations.124 It is unclear what the 
justification for such a drastic increase in the small business 
threshold is, other than to provide a tax benefit to the impacted 
businesses. The role of lobbying in the creation of de minimis tax 
rules is discussed further in the next Part. 
III.  PROBLEMS WITH DE MINIMIS TAX RULES 
Having surveyed the roles and functions of the de minimis 
rules that pervade the tax law in the preceding Part, this Part 
now turns to the potential pitfalls of de minimis tax rules. In 
short, de minimis tax rules may not always accomplish the 
functions described in Part II and may impose unintended costs. 
These drawbacks include increased complexity in other parts of 
the tax law, the tendency to take on unintended scope, 
particular susceptibility to lobbying, and administrative 
authority issues when such rules are created outside of the 
legislative process. 
 
 120. Note that the tax is applied to net business income and that 
accounting methods merely reflect the timing rather than amount of tax 
reported. 
 121. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., GEN. EXPLANATION OF 
PUB. L. 115-97 (Comm. Print 2018). 
 122. The gross receipts test is applied over a three-year period. See I.R.C. 
§ 448(c)(1). 
 123. See id. § 263A(i). 
 124. See, e.g., id. §§ 460(e)(1)(B), 471(c) (providing long-term completion 
method for construction contracts and inventories, respectively). 
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A.  De Minimis Tax Rules Allow the Tax Law to be More 
Complex 
While one of the principal functions of de minimis tax rules 
is reducing costs for taxpayers and the government, an 
under-appreciated feature of such rules is that they allow the 
rest of the tax law to be more complex. Specifically, by allowing 
certain taxpayers to avoid application of an underlying tax rule, 
de minimis rules also allow the law to be more burdensome than 
it otherwise would be for the taxpayers and transactions left in 
the generally applicable tax system. The intuition here is the 
same intuition behind the economic theory of price 
discrimination. Price discrimination involves charging different 
amounts for similar goods in a way that cannot be explained 
fully by differences in the marginal costs of producing the 
goods.125 By charging different prices, price discrimination 
allows producers to segment the market into consumers with 
different willingness to pay.126 This segmentation then enables 
the producer to earn more profit than if the producer were 
confined to average price across the entire market.127 
The analogue in the tax system is that, although not 
typically described this way, the tax system has different 
markets of taxpayers and transactions.128 Some taxpayers are 
very sophisticated taxpayers, often advised by specialized tax 
counsel, capable of understanding and responding to complex 
tax rules.129 Indeed, many such taxpayers need to be subject to 
 
 125. Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination and Competition, in 3 HANDBOOK 
OF INDUS. ORG. 2221, 2224–25 (2007). 
 126. Id. at 2226. 
 127. Id. at 2224. 
 128. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Andrew Blair-Stanek, Contractual 
Tax Reform, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1537, 1549–50 (2020) (proposing a move 
beyond one-size-fits-all taxation to better accommodate diverse taxpayers); 
Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax 
Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 690 (2009) (imagining different tax 
compliance and enforcement regimes to target different types of taxpayers); 
see also Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Simplexity: Plain Language and 
the Tax Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 189, 242–45 (2017) (exploring the differential 
impact of tax law “simplexity” on different taxpayers). 
 129. See, e.g., Tax Overview, FENWICK, https://perma.cc/2F4V-SD2H 
(“Fenwick has achieved a reputation as having one of the nation’s leading 
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complex tax rules, both to capture the complexity of the 
taxpayer’s transactions and to prevent such taxpayers from 
engaging in sophisticated transactions to lower their tax 
liability.130 Other taxpayers have lower ability to understand 
complex tax rules.131 Moreover, the latter group may engage in 
simpler transactions, which may not merit application of 
complex rules. These dissimilarly situated taxpayers can be 
thought of as different segments of the taxpayer market.132 
De minimis rules help differentiate complexity across the 
taxpayer market. For instance, the $10,000 de minimis 
threshold for below-market loans not only exempts relatively 
insignificant taxpayers or transactions from the complex 
below-market loan rules, but also helps enable these 
non-intuitive and complex rules to remain in the Code for 
others. Put another way, de minimis tax rules help avoid the 
extreme alternatives of applying complex rules to all taxpayers 
or eliminating those rules entirely. 
While this very feature of de minimis tax rules can serve as 
an underappreciated benefit in some circumstances, such rules 
may inadvertently preserve or encourage too much tax law 
complexity in others. For instance, the rules regarding the 199A 
deduction have been decried as inordinately complex and, in 
 
domestic and international tax practices [which] stems from its client base 
[including] over 100 Fortune 500 companies.”). 
 130. See Sloan G. Speck, Tax Planning and Policy Drift, 69 TAX L. REV. 
549, 573 (2016) (“Sophisticated targets often view the law as a tool rather than 
an imperative, and they may hire specialized experts to plan and structure 
their activities.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Simple Filing for Average Citizens: The 
California ReadyReturn, 107 TAX NOTES 1431, 1431 (2005) (explaining how 
even basic tax return requirements outpace many taxpayers’ reading levels). 
 132. The dichotomy described in taxpayer markets in the text is stylized 
rather than an accurate portrayal of what is a complicated set of 
circumstances. For instance, many taxpayers with relatively straightforward 
tax situations nonetheless engage in behavior to unjustifiably reduce their tax 
liability. This is quite common with cash business taxpayers. See, e.g., Susan 
Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 37, 38 (2009) (providing a foundational account of cash business tax 
evasion). The idea here is not that all sophisticated taxpayers create 
compliance problems whereas all less sophisticated taxpayers do not, or that 
there is even an uncontroversial understanding of what it means to be a 
sophisticated taxpayer. Rather, the idea is that there are clearly different 
markets of taxpayers that the tax law ideally needs to treat differently. 
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some ways, fundamentally nonsensical.133 While the de minimis 
threshold in § 199A blunts these costs for lower income 
taxpayers,134 it is not clear that blunting such costs is actually a 
desirable outcome, if it helped preserve seemingly nonsensical 
complexity for others, and avoided wholesale rethinking of the 
rules. 
Another, related point is that de minimis tax rules have 
important, underappreciated distributive consequences. When a 
particular constituency gains the benefit of a de minimis tax 
rule, that constituency is clearly subject to a lower tax burden 
than otherwise would have applied. But, by getting a de minimis 
tax rule in the law, the constituency also enables tax law 
drafters to make the generally applicable tax law more 
burdensome than it otherwise would have been. The 
constituency that gains the benefit of a de minimis tax rule thus 
has not only won for itself. In some ways, it has also ensured 
that other taxpayers and transactions will lose. Here, too, lack 
of attention to de minimis tax rules has obscured hidden costs 
that the rules impose on at least some taxpayers, and a careful 
consideration of when the benefits of the rules are worth the 
costs. 
B.  De Minimis Tax Rules May Take on an Unintended Scope 
De minimis tax rules impose unintended consequences that 
that go beyond preserving or even increasing the complexity of 
the general tax law. De minimis tax rules often take on an 
unintended scope, including creating de facto substantive rules 
when only procedural rules were intended, and locking in 
permanent fixes when a temporary and/or flexible approach is 
in order. 
 
 133. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Evaluating the New US Pass-Through 
Rules, 2018 BRIT. TAX REV. 49, 56–59 (harshly critiquing the 199A deduction 
and the lack of clear justification for it). 
 134. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
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1. Procedural Rules May Create De Facto Substantive Law 
As discussed previously, procedural de minimis rules 
pervade the tax law.135 Although these rules do not purport to 
alter substantive tax obligations, in practice they do so. 
Consider again the $600 threshold for 1099-MISC reporting. 
Technically, this is a procedural de minimis tax rule that does 
not purport to change a contractor’s obligation to report service 
income. But in practice, the de minimis rule heavily impacts 
how much income gets reported. 
Whereas the vast majority of income reported on a Form 
1099 is reported accurately to the IRS, income that is not subject 
to third-party information reporting is far less likely to be 
reported by the recipient.136 Returning to the example of a 
lawyer paying a gardener $300 for a one-off service with no 
Form 1099 obligation, there is a high probability that the 
gardener will not report the $300 of income, even though the tax 
law is clear that payments to contractors of any size are 
taxable.137 There are several possible explanations for this. 
Without information from a third party (like the lawyer), the 
IRS is unlikely to discover the gardener’s income.138 Thus, the 
gardener may knowingly fail to report it on his return, 
understanding that his odds of getting caught and penalized are 
extremely low.139 Second, it is possible that at least some 
taxpayers will fail to keep good records of their income, and 
without a Form 1099 as a reminder, forget to report it. Finally, 
and most critically with respect to the use of procedural de 
minimis tax rules, the $600 de minimis threshold may send a 
false signal to taxpayers that there is no legal obligation to 
 
 135. See supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text. 
 136. See BARRY W. JOHNSON ET AL., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N 1415 
(REV. 9-2019), FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR 
TAX YEARS 2011–2013 at 13 (2019). 
 137. See I.R.C. § 61. 
 138. An individual taxpayer’s chance of being audited is less than 1 
percent. Compliance Presence, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://perma.cc
/MU76-QHRQ (last updated Oct. 22, 2020). 
 139. See Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the 
Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1733, 1738–39 (2010) (describing the deterrence function of information 
reporting). 
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report income for which there is no Form 1099.140 In other 
words, the procedural de minimis tax rule may unintentionally 
lead the gardener to falsely believe that income under $600 is 
not reportable at all. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that procedural de minimis tax 
rules do, indeed, tend to confuse taxpayers, making them believe 
that what is really only a procedural de minimis threshold in 
fact changes substantive tax law. Tax advisors report online 
that a “myth that refuses to die more than any other” is that 
payments under $600 are not subject to tax liability,”141 and that 
“[i]t is commonly believed that you do not have to report your 
earnings unless they meet or exceed $600.”142 Other online 
advisors try to explain that tax liability is still owed for 
payments below the threshold amount, even though the 
procedural de minimis exception “can make things a little 
confusing for the taxpayer . . . since logic can easily lead you to 
conclude that you don’t have to file taxes if you don’t receive a 
form.”143 Still other websites catalog taxpayers wrestling with 
the question and expressing confusion about whether they have 
to pay tax on less than $600.144 
Viewed in this context, the $600 threshold for reporting 
independent contractor income has changed perceptions of the 
law in a way that exceeds the intended impacts on procedure 
only. Indeed, to the extent that the procedural de minimis 
threshold changes perceptions of the law, it expands well beyond 
procedure into the realm of substantive tax collection. For those 
 
 140. See, e.g., Kelly Phillips Erb, Ask the Taxgirl: Reporting Income Under 
$600, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2012, 4:28 PM), https://perma.cc/A69K-EWDL 
(explaining that only a $600 and above payment triggers the issuance of a 
federal form 1099, but it does not mean that taxpayers are permitted to 
exclude income payments less than $600 from their taxes). 
 141. Have You Fallen for the $600 Tax Reporting Myth?, ARTISTIC 
CONSPIRACY, https://perma.cc/TBD9-CXDM. 
 142. Do You Have to Report Freelance Income if You Make Less Than $600 
a Year?, CHRON, https://perma.cc/AGC4-XUDD (last updated Sept. 10, 2020). 
 143. Stephanie Faris, Do I Have to Report Earnings Under $600?, ZACKS, 
https://perma.cc/S2WP-B6DP (last updated Mar. 9, 2019). 
 144. See, e.g., If I Had a Job that I Made Less Than $600 Do I Have to 
Claim That?, INTUIT TURBO: REAL MONEY TALK (June 7, 2019, 3:32 PM), https://
perma.cc/5TWN-NYGG. 
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taxpayers who do not pay tax on their income, it has facilitated 
a de facto, substantive tax law exemption. 
A de facto exemption for income under $600 may not be 
undesirable, at least at first glance. Given the low amount of tax 
revenue at stake for a one-off transaction under $600, the 
compliance costs on the part of the taxpayer and enforcement 
costs on the part of the IRS may not be justified. But this 
assumes that unreported transactions happen infrequently for 
each taxpayer, which is not necessarily the case. Consider again 
a gardener who is paid $300 by a lawyer for removing a tree. 
Assume the gardener’s business primarily consists of one-time 
tree removal transactions, and that he conducts 300 of such 
transactions a year, all of which cost $300. Suddenly, the 
revenue at stake is much higher (the tax on $90,000 of income 
in this example). Yet, if each transaction involves a different 
payor, the gardener will not receive any 1099s. If the gardener 
views the de minimis threshold on 1099 reporting as a 
substantive tax exemption, his tax liability will have changed 
significantly, with attendant consequences on the fairness and 
efficiency of the tax system overall. 
It is also not clear that Congress, in enacting procedural de 
minimis tax rules, intends to create de facto substantive tax 
exemptions. Indeed, if Congress did think that income below a 
certain threshold amount should not be taxed, it would be more 
straightforward for Congress to explicitly say so (along with 
ancillary changes to any reporting requirements). Doing so 
would create a more transparent sense of how much revenue the 
government can expect to raise, and, critically, would make 
actual expectations about tax liability more transparent to 
taxpayers. The fact that Congress has not created substantive 
exemptions should thus be read as an indication that Congress 
did not intend to make them. This means that procedural de 
minimis tax rules are creating de facto substantive exemptions 
inconsistent with Congress’s intentions for the tax law. 
A de facto tax exemption is problematic for other reasons, 
as well. Some gardeners will underreport income when they 
don’t receive a Form 1099, but others will report honestly, 
violating horizontal equity between taxpayers. A widespread 
practice of not reporting income under the $600 threshold may 
also perpetuate confusion about the rules among taxpayers or 
resentment from honest taxpayers. Finally, broad 
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noncompliance in certain sectors may distort the market by 
encouraging oversupply of de facto “tax-exempt” jobs (like 
gardeners, in this example).145 
The rules for reporting on Form 1099-K provide a relatively 
recent illustration of these problems. The Form 1099-K rules 
were enacted in 2008 to require information reporting by credit 
card companies and other financial intermediaries.146 As 
discussed in Part II, for certain parties, the threshold for issuing 
a Form 1099-K is $20,000 and two hundred transactions.147 
These rules generally apply to payments made through online 
intermediaries.148 Consider, for example, an internet platform 
like Airbnb. Renters who rent homes on the platform remit 
payment to Airbnb, the online intermediary.149 Airbnb collects a 
fee and remits the remainder of the renter’s payment to the 
owner; the owner, in turn, is obligated to report the payment as 
rental income.150 Because the transaction takes place through 
Airbnb (an online intermediary) and not directly between two 
parties (as in the gardener-lawyer example), the Form 1099-K 
rules apply rather than the Form 1099-MISC rules.151 Those 
 
 145. See Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the 
Cash Economy, 117 TAX NOTES 506, 506–08 (2007) (“To the extent workers and 
investors experience disutility in underreporting, there will be less 
tax-induced movement to the cash sector and lower welfare costs. We know 
that underreporting is the norm in the cash sector.”). 
 146. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., TECH. EXPLANATION OF 
DIV. C OF H.R. 3221, THE “HOUSING ASSISTANCE TAX ACT OF 2008” AS 
SCHEDULED FOR CONSIDERATION BY H.R. ON JULY 23, 2008, at 60–61 (Comm. 
Print 2008) (discussing the purpose of § 6050W to require credit card 
information reporting). 
 147. See I.R.C. § 6050W(e). 
 148. See id. § 6050W(a), (b)(3); see also Third Party Network Transactions 
FAQs, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://perma.cc/T8PL-YT3P (last updated 
Aug. 17, 2020) (outlining the characteristics of third-party settlement 
organizations and citing the most common example as an “online 
auction-payment facilitator”). 
 149. See Why Should I Pay and Communicate Through Airbnb Directly?, 
AIRBNB, https://perma.cc/3P58-Z8JF. 
 150. See What Are Airbnb Service Fees?, AIRBNB, https://perma.cc/K8XK-
7DVK. 
 151. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(a)(1)(iv) (2010) (“Transactions that are 
described in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section [third-party network 
transactions] that otherwise would be subject to reporting under both sections 
6041 and 6050W are reported under section 6050W and not section 6041.”). 
DE MINIMIS TAX RULES 809 
 
rules require Airbnb to issue a Form 1099-K to the owner only 
if Airbnb facilitated payments exceeding $20,000 for that owner 
and over two hundred payment transactions took place.152 The 
threshold is, of course, much higher than the $600 threshold 
that applies to the gardener. 
The much higher 1099-K threshold arguably applies to all 
sorts of gig economy transactions that take place through online 
platforms.153 In another work, one of us argued that Congress 
did not contemplate the pervasiveness of internet platform 
transactions when it enacted the de minimis threshold and that 
the threshold should be made much lower.154 In the meantime, 
we can expect the same de facto income exemption to exist in 
this context as in the Form 1099-MISC context. In other words, 
there is a high likelihood that people earning under $20,000 
from internet platforms will not report their income. The much 
larger Form 1099-K threshold makes this de facto exemption 
significantly more problematic. Not only are higher dollar 
amounts at stake, but the $20,000 threshold expands the reach 
of the de facto exemption significantly. For example, one study 
of gig economy workers showed that the majority of such 
workers do not earn more than $10,000 per year.155 This 
potentially means that a significant number of gig economy 
workers do not receive 1099s, and many likely fail to report their 
gig income accurately.156 
 
 152. See I.R.C. § 6050W(e). 
 153. “Arguably” because the application of the Form 1099-K threshold to 
gig economy platforms has been debated, and some platforms (e.g., Uber) have 
taken the position that they will use the $600 threshold. See, e.g., Shu-Yi Oei 
& Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989, 1034–38 
(2016). 
 154. See Thomas, supra note 61, at 1436–37 (suggesting that 
developments in technology and tax enforcement should prompt a revision in 
how the gig economy is taxed). 
 155. See DIANA FARRELL & FIONA GREIG, JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. INST., 
PAYCHECKS, PAYDAYS, AND THE ONLINE PLATFORM ECONOMY 24 (2016), https://
perma.cc/4UUN-HW3S (PDF) (finding that the “Online Platform Economy” 
was a secondary source of income for the average participant, and the vast 
majority relied on it for only 25 percent of their income). 
 156. See Thomas, supra note 61, at 1428. 
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Finally, consider again the $250 threshold for 
substantiating charitable contributions.157 Although the $250 
threshold does not impact the deductibility of charitable 
contributions, in practice, this threshold may function like the 
Form 1099 rules. In other words, because taxpayers are not 
required to substantiate charitable contributions to a particular 
donee under $250, we can expect to see more noncompliance 
under the threshold, based in part on mistaken taxpayer beliefs 
about the impact of the substantiation threshold. Whereas Form 
1099 noncompliance looks like non-reporting of income, 
noncompliance in this context might mean claiming deductions 
for donations that were not made or that were not made to 
qualifying tax-exempt organizations. 
2.  Lock-In of a Temporary Solution 
De minimis tax rules may also create permanent fixes to 
problems that continue to evolve over time. By virtue of being 
statutory or regulatory rules, de minimis tax rules are 
inherently “sticky” compared to alternatives like an 
administrative nonenforcement policy. This stickiness can 
prevent administrative solutions from evolving over time to 
match the underlying problem. 
One context in which this problem arises is when Congress 
fails to index de minimis tax rules. To be sure, some de minimis 
tax rules, like the statutory income threshold in § 199A, are 
adjusted annually for inflation.158 But many de minimis tax 
rules are not indexed. Consider the $600 threshold for issuing 
Form 1099-MISC, which has been in place without adjustment 
since 1954.159 Based on inflation alone, the threshold requires 
information reporting for much smaller transactions today than 
it did previously, which may not make sense from a compliance 
cost perspective.160 But failing to index the threshold has also 
 
 157. See supra Part II.A. 
 158. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 159. MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41400, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF THE ENHANCED FORM 1099 INFORMATION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 10 
(2011). 
 160. For example, a $600 payment in May of 1954 would be equivalent to 
a $5,719 payment in May of 2020. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. 
STAT., https://perma.cc/7GVQ-LSZJ. On the other hand, technological 
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made it significantly harder for Congress to implement sensible 
expansions to the scope of the Form 1099-MISC requirement. 
The current 1099-MISC rule contains numerous exceptions. 
For instance, the reporting requirement only applies to 
payments by persons engaged in a trade or business and does 
not apply to payments for goods (rather than services).161 In 
2010 and 2011, as part of healthcare reform legislation, 
Congress expanded the reporting requirement in various ways, 
including by applying it to payments for goods and rent 
payments even if the lessor was not in the “trade or business” of 
renting property.162 This set off a rallying cry of opposition, with 
opponents arguing that these increased reporting requirements 
hurt small businesses and unsophisticated taxpayers.163 This 
opposition was successful, and the increased reporting 
requirements were repealed.164 
This repeal occurred in part because the relatively low de 
minimis threshold of $600 enabled opposition to argue 
convincingly that the new reporting requirements were too 
burdensome for taxpayers, such as small businesses.165 A higher 
de minimis threshold would have made it harder to attack the 
law as too burdensome for small businesses and other similarly 
situated taxpayers.166 Indeed, one Congressional Research 
Service analyst explored raising the threshold amount, 
 
advances have likely made the cost of information reporting significantly 
cheaper than it was in the 1950s, in which case a lower threshold in today’s 
dollars may make sense. 
 161. See KEIGHTLEY, supra note 159, at 2. 
 162. Id. at 1. 
 163. See, e.g., Robb Mandelbaum, Why the New 1099 Rules Aren’t that Bad 
for Small Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2011, 1:00 PM), https://perma.cc
/LX5V-6HW9 (asserting that “nobody in Washington” has anything good to say 
about the increased reporting requirements). 
 164. See Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of 
Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act of 2011, I.R.C. § 6041. 
 165. See, e.g., KEIGHTLEY, supra note 159, at 6 (explaining concern over 
small businesses and low exemption amount as main source of opposition). 
 166. Raising the threshold amount to $5,000 and adding an additional de 
minimis exemption for small business with twenty-five or fewer employees 
was explicitly considered in response to small business gripes about the 
burdens of the new reporting requirements. 156 CONG. REC. S7,053 (daily ed. 
Sept. 14, 2010) (statement of Sen. Bill Nelson). 
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explaining, “A higher threshold would ease the burden many 
small businesses claim the new requirements impose, since it 
would presumably reduce the number of transactions that 
require a 1099-MISC to be completed.”167 The role that a higher 
threshold could have played illustrates the more general 
phenomenon: the ability to revisit de minimis rules over time 
can blunt criticisms that the generally applicable law is too 
burdensome for certain constituencies. But the very 
promulgation of a de minimis rule in the form of a statute or 
regulations can tend to preclude such re-visitation in a way that 
makes it harder to change the generally applicable law. 
The de minimis fringe benefits rule under § 132 provides 
another illustration of this administrative lock-in problem. 
When the IRS first recognized an exclusion for de minimis fringe 
benefits in the 1950s, it referred to “the value of a turkey, ham, 
or other item of merchandise of similar nominal value, 
distributed by an employer to an employee at Christmas, or a 
comparable holiday.”168 Congress codified this result when it 
enacted § 132 in 1984, and regulations cite occasional cocktail 
parties, holiday gifts, coffee, doughnuts, and soft drinks as 
examples of de minimis fringes.169 But the landscape of fringe 
benefits in 2020 looks vastly different than it did in the 
twentieth century.170 Today, companies (often technology 
companies in Silicon Valley) offer a vast array of workplace 
perks that range from onsite haircuts, yoga classes, gourmet 
cafeterias, to laundry.171 It appears many of these benefits go 
unreported, arguably, because they are hard to value and thus 
may be considered tax-free de minimis fringes.172 But in the 
aggregate, such benefits far exceed the value of an occasional 
cocktail party or ham, and Congress clearly did not contemplate 
the compensation regimes we see today.173 
 
 167. KEIGHTLEY, supra note 159, at 10. 
 168. Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 C.B. 17. 
 169. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (1984). 
 170. See generally Soled & Thomas, supra note 114 (exploring the “fringe 
benefit evolution” that has occurred over the last seventy years). 
 171. Id. at 779. 
 172. Id. at 814. 
 173. Id. at 765, 813. 
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In its current form, § 132 is ill-equipped to handle the 
taxation of many modern-day fringe benefits. The result is 
confusion about the state of the tax law, inequities in terms of 
who benefits from the rule, and potential revenue loss and 
inefficiencies from the nonreporting of many fringe benefits.174 
The upside of codifying the exclusion for de minimis fringes (and 
other fringe benefits) in 1984 was that it provided clarity for 
taxpayers at that time.175 But with new, uncontemplated 
benefits recently emerging, the static nature of the statute 
reveals drawbacks. 
Likewise, the de minimis rules for OID made more sense 
when enacted as a way protect taxpayers from the complexity of 
calculating hidden interest on small loans or on small hidden 
interest amounts.176 Calculating original issue discount as it 
accrues ratably over the life of a debt instrument requires 
advanced mathematical tools and thus, without the use of 
sophisticated computational tools, can be quite burdensome.177 
Congress was cognizant of such burdens, especially as it 
significantly expanded the scope of the OID rules to cover a 
larger and larger swath of transactions over several decades.178 
As a result, in 1984, when Congress extended application of the 
rules, Congress added the de minimis rules to ensure that the 
complexities would not “apply to most routine transactions of 
individual taxpayers, or to de minimis transactions of 
 
 174. Id. at 814–15. 
 175. Id. at 769–70. 
 176. See supra notes 80–91 and accompanying text (discussing OID rules 
and de minimis exceptions). 
 177. See Jaime Cuevas Dermody & R. Tyrrell Rockafellar, Mathematics of 
Debt Instrument Taxation, reprinted in 3 FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & 
INSTRUMENTS 4 (1994) (exploring the mathematics of debt instruments, as 
applicable to original issue discount, market discount, and other tax 
principles). 
 178. Codification of the ratable accrual rules occurred as part of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 91ST CONG., SUMMARY 
OF H.R. 13270, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 60–61 (Comm. Print) 
(describing the issue). The IRS successfully argued for treatment of hidden 
interest as interest (albeit not ratably accrued) prior to this time. See United 
States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 61–65 (1965). 
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individuals or others.”179 While this may have made sense in 
1984, the advent of sophisticated computerized computational 
tools since that time has made the actual calculation 
significantly less burdensome. And yet, the de minimis 
threshold enacted as part of the statute continues to exempt 
small loans and hidden interest, arguably creating a much less 
justifiable giveaway for many transactions. 
To be sure, this problem is not unique to de minimis tax 
rules or even to the tax law; legislation tends to be sticky180 and 
that stickiness can impose costs. In the criminal law context, for 
instance, scholars have lamented outdated criminalization of 
offenses such as adultery, fornication, sodomy, and railroad 
trespass.181 In some ways the problem of outdating is similar, 
but exacerbated, in the context of de minimis tax rules. This is 
not to say that attitudes cannot change rapidly regarding 
criminalized offenses. Rather, the claim is that, inherently, 
what is deemed “insignificant” from an administrative point of 
view is likely to change more rapidly over time than shifting 
mores regarding crimes like adultery. In any event, lock-in 
matters in both cases. 
More significantly, the inflexibility of de minimis tax rules 
is particularly problematic because de minimis rules are 
intended to resolve administrative problems. But they do so by 
locking in forbearance from the generally applicable approach. 
In so doing, de minimis rules undermine the very administrative 
flexibility they are designed to promote. Police, prosecutors, and 
judges, for instance, can simply fail to enforce outdated criminal 
laws (though they will not always do so, and there may be 
questions about whether nonenforcement is the best way to 
achieve removal of such laws from practice).182 But tax law 
 
 179. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION 
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 (Comm. 
Print). 
 180. Jason Oh, The Pivotal Politics of Temporary Legislation, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. 1055, 1067 (2015). 
 181. Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
223, 229 (2007). 
 182. There is a large and growing literature on administrative 
forbearance, in particular in the criminal law context. See, e.g., Roger Fairfax, 
Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1244–46 (2011) 
(analyzing generally the phenomenon of prosecutorial nullification); W. Kerrel 
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administrators are more hamstrung by de minimis tax rules 
that actually dictate the administrative practices they have to 
take and, more problematically, those they are no longer 
entitled to take. The Code, for instance, tells taxpayers that de 
minimis OID simply does not constitute OID.183 As a result, it 
need not be reported on information returns, or to the IRS, or 
considered at all in the calculation of OID.184 The enactment of 
this rule, meant to alleviate undue administrative burdens, thus 
actually precludes the IRS, the tax administrator, from 
adjusting when such administrative burdens change. The more 
general lesson is that lock-in, a problem that is inherent to the 
creation of formal law, may be particularly problematic when 
administrative forbearance is the point, as with de minimis tax 
rules, rather than a potential solution to the lock-in effect, as is 
the case with criminal law. 
C.  De Minimis Tax Rules Are Particularly Susceptible to 
Rent-Seeking that Benefits Insiders 
Aside from being inflexible, de minimis tax rules are also 
particularly susceptible to the type of problematic rent-seeking 
that can disproportionately benefit insiders. While tax 
scholarship has not paid particular attention to the phenomenon 
of de minimis tax rules, industry insiders know well the value 
such rules can confer. Indeed, the fact that de minimis tax rules 
may fly beneath the radar as seemingly insignificant makes 
them particularly valuable to knowledgeable insiders. This is 
evident from the regulatory process that followed the recent 
enactment of the TCJA.185 The legislation itself was passed 
through Congress extraordinarily quickly, leaving many 
 
Murray, Populist Prosecutorial Nullification, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2021) (exploring state prosecutors’ categorical nonenforcement); James 
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 
1551 (1981) (critiquing vastness of prosecutorial discretion). 
 183. See I.R.C. § 1273(a)(3) (“If the [OID] is less than 1/4th of 1 percent of 
the stated redemption price at maturity, multiplied by the number of complete 
years to maturity, then the [OID] shall be treated as zero.”). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code). 
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uncertainties and downright mistakes that needed to be ironed 
out in the regulatory process.186 
One of the principal areas of regulatory action focused on 
§ 199A and what would constitute a “specified service trade or 
business” (“SSTB”) which, under the statute, will not produce 
the valuable qualified business income deduction.187 Great 
uncertainty as to what would constitute SSTBs created 
particularly robust lobbying opportunities in the regulatory 
process.188 
Industries ultimately won some major victories about the 
definition of SSTBs in the regulatory process. For instance, in a 
heavily watched and much discussed win for the banking 
industry, Treasury concluded that “financial services” does not 
include “taking deposits or making loans.”189 As a result, 
engaging in such activities would not make banks ineligible for 
the deduction. 
Alongside these major definitional decisions was another, 
less salient, but arguably no less important regulatory decision: 
Treasury offered a de minimis rule for SSTBs. Under this de 
minimis rule, if a business has gross receipts of $25 million or 
less, the business will not be considered an SSTB if less than 10 
percent of the business’s gross receipts are attributable to the 
performance of services that constitute an SSTB.190 If a business 
has gross receipts in excess of $25 million, then the de minimis 
rule uses a 5, rather than 10 percent, threshold.191 
The statute itself did not seem to call for or contemplate 
such a de minimis rule. Nonetheless, in offering the de minimis 
rule, Treasury explained that, 
Although the statute, read literally, does not suggest that a 
certain quantum of specified service activity is necessary to 
 
 186. See, e.g., Oei & Osofsky, supra note 9, at 256. 
 187. I.R.C. § 199A(d) (providing that “qualified trade or business” does not 
include “specified service trade or business” and defining “specified service 
trade or business”). A statutory de minimis rule allows taxpayers with income 
below threshold amounts to qualify for the deduction even if the business is an 
SSTB, as discussed in supra Part II.B.1. 
 188. Oei & Osofsky, supra note 9, at 217–20. 
 189. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(b)(2)(xiv) (as amended in 2019). 
 190. Id. § 1.199A-5(c)(1)(i). 
 191. Id. § 1.199A-5(c)(1)(ii). 
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find an SSTB, the Treasury Department and the IRS believe 
that requiring all taxpayers to evaluate and quantify any 
amount of specified service activity would create 
administrative complexity and undue burdens for both 
taxpayers and the IRS. Therefore . . . it is appropriate to 
provide a de minimis rule, under which a trade or business 
will not be considered to be an SSTB merely because it 
provides a small amount of services in a specified service 
activity.192 
With this explanation, Treasury offered a de minimis rule, 
seemingly out of whole cloth, for the stated purpose of 
eliminating “administrative complexity and undue burdens.”193 
While Treasury presented the de minimis rule as in some 
ways a rounding error for “small amount[s] of services,” the 
reality was that this de minimis rule has substantial impacts on 
tax burdens. Take, for instance, a business with gross receipts 
of $100 million. Imagine that 4.5 percent of the business’s gross 
receipts are attributable to the performance of services that 
would clearly constitute an SSTB under the statute (such as, for 
instance, the performance of “financial services”).194 As a result 
of the de minimis rule, the entire $100 million of the business’s 
gross income would remain eligible for the qualified business 
income deduction.195 Under the statute, however, it is not clear 
this is the right result.196 Indeed, one possibility under the 
statute (ultimately rejected by the de minimis rule), could have 
been that, to the extent the business engages in any activities 
that constitute an SSTB, the business would not be eligible for 
any qualified business income deduction. The facts of this 
example reveal the potentially extreme consequences of the 
different choices. In this case, the de minimis rule results in 
 
 192. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Qualified Business Income Deduction, 
REG-107892-18, at 51, https://perma.cc/4PS2-7AJR (PDF). 
 193. Id. 
 194. I.R.C. § 1202(e)(3)(A) (as incorporated by reference and altered by 
I.R.C. § 199A(d)(2)(A)). 
 195. The calculation of what income is actually eligible for the qualified 
business income deduction is quite complicated and is not a straight deduction 
from gross income. See id. § 199A(a)–(c). 
 196. No de minimis exception is mentioned or specifically contemplated in 
the statute’s definition of SSTB. See id. § 199(d)(2) (defining SSTB). 
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$100 million of the business’s gross income being eligible for the 
deduction, relative to an alternative in which the business is 
entirely disqualified from the deduction!197 Multiplied across 
taxpayers, the de minimis rule, rather than a mere rounding 
error, has huge revenue and allocative implications. 
Industry insiders inherently understood the value of the de 
minimis rule, repeatedly engaging with it in the regulatory 
process. For instance, the most common comment submitted 
during the regulation’s notice-and-comment process was a form 
letter by S corporation banks asking for beneficial treatment 
under the SSTB rules.198 These letters asked for two things: a 
more favorable definition of which banking activities should be 
excluded from the SSTB definition and a more favorable de 
minimis rule.199 Of the two, the letters focused more on the de 
minimis rule.200 With respect to the de minimis rule, the form 
letter argued, among other things, that “[t]he proposed rule’s de 
minimum thresholds for revenues derived from specified service 
trades or businesses (SSTBs) are unreasonably low and will trip 
up hundreds of community banks in their ability to use the tax 
relief as intended as intended [sic] by Congress.”201 As detailed 
by Treasury in the preamble to the final regulations, 
commentators also made many more specific requests about the 
de minimis rule in the notice-and-comment process.202 
The fact that the de minimis rule conferred a substantial 
benefit on taxpayers, in some cases equal to or greater than 
major definitional decisions is not to say that it was unjustified. 
But the lack of a framework around de minimis tax rules meant 
there was little basis for making such an evaluation. There were 
also fundamental, unanswered questions about whether the de 
minimis rule could be justified at all, at least based on the 
 
 197. Another, middle-ground possibility could have been disallowance only 
to the extent of SSTB activity. 
 198. See, e.g., Kenan Warren, Comment Letter on Proposed Qualified 
Business Income Deduction (Sept. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/EX9P-23LQ 
(providing one example of many form letters submitted as a comment). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Qualified Business Income Deduction, 84 Fed. Reg. 2952-01, 2975–76 
(Feb. 8, 2019) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
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proffered reasons offered by Treasury. If the point of the de 
minimis rule was to alleviate “administrative complexity and 
undue burdens for both taxpayers and the IRS,” would the de 
minimis rule, as crafted, accomplish that goal? Wouldn’t it be 
the case that, as drafted, the de minimis rule would actually 
make it more important for taxpayers to keep track of small 
amounts of SSTB activity to ensure they were below the de 
minimis threshold?203 The fact that de minimis rules are often 
subject to little searching review likely helped avoid careful 
consideration of such questions and ensure a big industry win. 
D.  The Administrative Authority for Non-Statutory De 
Minimis Rules is Uncertain 
The prevalence of de minimis rules in the tax regulatory 
process raises a final issue. Congress, by virtue of its legislative 
power,204 certainly has the authority to make de minimis rules 
in tax statutes. But what about the many de minimis rules 
contained in tax regulations? Does Treasury have the authority 
to make them? As this Part illustrates, Treasury is actually on 
shaky ground in promulgating these rules. There are a number 
of canons of statutory interpretation which, while not 
conclusively, suggest limits on the ability of Treasury or courts 
to create de minimis tax rules. Judicial authority about the role 
of Congress, the agency, and courts sheds even more doubt on 
Treasury’s de minimis authority. Thus, even though de minimis 
tax rules may play an important role in the tax law, it may be 
incumbent on Congress to play the dominant role in making 
them. 
1.  Statutory Interpretation 
Congress can make de minimis tax rules and does, indeed, 
make them. Even when Congress does not itself supply a de 
 
 203. At least one commentator raised this as an issue in a public hearing 
about the regulations. Public Hearing on Proposed Regulations: ‘Qualified 
Business Deduction,’ United States Department of Treasury, TAXNOTES Doc. 
2018-41216, Oct. 16, 2018, at 28 (“If everyone out there has to run through the 
De Minimis test then it appears to be contrary to some of the announced 
purposes of the guidance in the preamble.”) (on file with author). 
 204. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
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minimis tax rule, Congress sometimes explicitly asks Treasury 
to do so. For instance, in setting out the rules regarding 
employee retirement plans, Congress declared that, “[t]he 
Secretary shall by regulations provide that this subparagraph 
shall not apply to any plan amendment . . . unless such 
amendment adversely affects the rights of any participant in a 
more than de minimis manner.”205 
These and other examples beg the question: does the fact 
that Congress explicitly provides or requests de minimis tax 
rules in some cases indicate an intent not to have them in 
others? A number of canons of construction would suggest as 
much. Canons are interpretive presumptions regarding the 
meaning of statutes. A number of canons could support an 
inference that Congress’s explicit provision of or request for de 
minimis tax rules in some places indicates Congress’s intent (or 
at least assumption) that they will not exist in others. 
For instance, courts often apply a “rule against 
superfluities,” under which no part of the statute is deemed 
“superfluous, void or insignificant.”206 Applying this rule, 
Congress’s explicit request in some places for Treasury to create 
a de minimis rule may be superfluous if Treasury always has 
this authority. Likewise, another canon of construction, 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, provides that expressing 
one thing excludes another.207 Court have even applied this 
canon specifically to statutory exceptions. In doing so, courts 
have explained that “[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates 
certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional 
exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a 
contrary legislative intent.”208 Applying this canon, explicit 
provision of or request for de minimis exceptions in some cases 
again implies they will not exist in others. Or, even more 
sweepingly, when Congress provides any exceptions to a general 
 
 205. I.R.C. § 411(d)(6)(B). 
 206. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004). 
 207. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002). 
 208. Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980); see 
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) 
(“[I]f [sic] statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify 
the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded.”). 
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rule, providing those exceptions may imply that no other 
exceptions, including de minimis exceptions, exist.209 
However, there are a number of reasons why these canons 
are not conclusive. First, at a high level, it is not clear that we 
should embrace the canons at all as a means of determining 
whether Treasury or courts can make de minimis rules in 
situations in which Congress has not spoken. While canons have 
long played an important role in statutory interpretation, 
scholars have also long questioned their utility. Karl Llewellyn 
famously illustrated how each canon of construction has a 
counter-canon, undermining the canons’ credibility as objective 
tools to make meaning of a statute.210 Since Llewellyn’s work, 
many scholars have deepened the critique, arguing, among 
other things, that courts may use canons as a cover to disguise 
ideologically driven decisions.211 Recently, some scholars have 
questioned the extent to which courts’ use of canons makes 
sense in light of the realities of the legislative process.212 
Legislative drafters have varying understanding of the canons, 
and often the canons make assumptions that do not map onto 
legislative realities.213 For instance, the fact that Congress 
 
 209. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 705 F.3d 458, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(rejecting the EPA’s authority to create a de minimis rule, in part by 
explaining, “[t]hat Congress provided only one exception to this monitoring 
requirement—a shorter monitoring period—suggests that Congress did not 
intend any other exceptions”). 
 210. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and 
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 
395, 401–06 (1950). But see, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, 
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66–67 (1994) (exploring 
benefits of interpretive regimes). 
 211. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? 
Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 562 
(1992) (summarizing view of some prominent scholars and judges that “canons 
have actually been abused as part of the judiciary’s systematic attempt to 
frustrate legislative policy preferences”). 
 212. For some foundational work in this area, see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside— An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. 
L. REV. 901, 904 (2013); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory 
Interpretation from the Inside— An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, 
Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 731 (2014). 
 213. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 212, at 904 (exploring throughout 
how canons make assumptions that may not map onto legislative process). 
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explicitly referred to the possibility of a de minimis tax rule in 
one part of the Code but not another may reflect different 
drafting styles by different drafters at different times, not a 
conscious decision to allow de minimis rules in one place but not 
the other. 
Second, even assuming canons have value in some contexts, 
it is not clear that they apply indiscriminately to all 
interpreters. Canons historically have been judicial interpretive 
tools.214 While it is debatable whether legislative drafters 
actually mean for courts to apply them, legislative drafters may 
at least expect at some level that courts will use these judicially 
fashioned tools.215 In contrast, it is even less clear that 
legislative drafters intend or expect agencies to rely on canons 
of construction. Agency officials and legislative drafters often 
work in close relationships to develop statutes.216 As a result, 
legislative drafters may expect that agency officials have an 
inside understanding of their intention with respect to the 
statute. This inside understanding may include a sense that 
Congress did not mean for the agency to apply a tax provision 
when the tax liability or taxpayer were insignificant.217 Even 
absent a claim of inside information, Congress generally expects 
implementing agencies to exercise discretion in carrying out 
 
 214. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, The Canons of Statutory Construction 
and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 671 (1992) (“The canons are 
attractive judicial tools simply because they permit judges to decide cases 
without invoking substantive principles of right and wrong.”). 
 215. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 212, at 929 (finding varying 
degrees of familiarity by legislative drafters with judicial canons of 
construction). 
 216. See Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1377, 1377 (2017). 
 217. See, e.g., Adirondack Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 740 F.3d 692, 697 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (“And when countervailed by a broad grant of authority contained 
within the same statutory scheme, the canon is a poor indicator of Congress’ 
intent.”). On the other hand, many have argued that canons help create 
objective meaning for statutes. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor 
Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275, 1305 (2020) (explaining that the “linguistic 
canons are widely heralded as ‘rule-like,’ ‘predictable,’ and ‘objective’ 
interpretive tools”). It is arguably problematic for an agency to be able to defeat 
objective meaning that can be understood through the use of canons. As 
already mentioned, however, the notion that canons do in fact create objective 
meaning is widely subject to debate. 
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statutes.218 Courts have suggested that canons of construction 
may be “especially feeble . . . where Congress is presumed to 
have left to reasonable agency discretion questions that it has 
not directly resolved.”219 
Finally, even assuming that canons are useful tools of 
construction that a specific interpreter should apply, it is often 
unclear what interpretation the canons should yield in the given 
context.220 In the case at hand, the fact that Congress explicitly 
creates or asks for a de minimis tax rule in some instances does 
not necessarily mean that Congress means to preclude de 
minimis tax rules in others. Rather, explicitly creating or 
requesting de minimis rules in some places may simply mean 
that Congress is requiring them in these places while leaving 
the matter to the discretion of the implementing agency in other 
places. 
2.  Separation of Powers 
Rather than being a straightforward statutory 
interpretation question, regulatory de minimis tax rules raise 
more fundamental questions about separation of powers and 
administrative and judicial authority: When Congress has 
provided general rules and has not explicitly authorized an 
agency or court to create exceptions, do agencies or courts still 
have the authority to do so? Is providing such exceptions 
inherent in administrative or judicial powers? Or would creating 
exceptions to the general law set down by Congress undermine 
Congress’s lawmaking power? 
As an initial matter, it is worthwhile to note that courts 
rarely create their own de minimis tax law exceptions. There are 
some cases in which courts do so, or at least seem to encourage 
 
 218. See Walker, supra note 216, at 1417 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank 
(S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740– 41 (1996) (“Congress, when it left ambiguity in 
a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the 
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired 
the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion 
the ambiguity allows.”). 
 219. Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing 
Cheney R. Co. v. ICC, 902 F.2d 66, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
 220. See, e.g., Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 381 (2013) (“The 
force of any negative implication, however, depends on context.”). 
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legislative creation of such exceptions. For instance, courts have 
long wrestled with the question of when states can impose 
obligations to collect and remit sales tax on out-of-state 
sellers.221 In a 2018 opinion, the Supreme Court found that 
states can impose such obligations on out-of-state sellers even 
when such sellers do not have a physical presence in the state, 
at least under certain conditions.222 The Court was careful to 
point out that these conditions were met in the case in part 
because the state at issue only imposed such obligations on 
“sellers that deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into 
[the State] or engage in 200 or more separate transactions for 
the delivery of goods and services into the State on an annual 
basis.”223 The Court also indicated that the outcome might be 
different for “small businesses with only de minimis contacts” 
with the state.224 The Court thus seemed to require some sort of 
de minimis exception to imposition of state tax obligations. 
However, this decision was not as much an issue of tax law as it 
was an interpretation of the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution.225 Pursuant to that clause, federal courts have 
long had power to ensure that states do not unduly burden 
interstate commerce.226 The Court’s almost singular turn to a de 
minimis tax rule in the context of interstate commerce thus 
underscores the general phenomenon: courts do not tend to craft 
their own de minimis tax law exceptions. 
This makes sense in light of the framework that courts have 
adopted for statutory interpretation and administrative 
deference. Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
 
 221. See generally, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 
U.S. 298 (1992); Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) 
(prior treatments by the Court). 
 222. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 2087 (“The question is whether the out-of-state seller can be 
held responsible for its payment, and this turns on a proper interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause.”). 
 226. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945) 
(“[I]n general Congress has left it to the courts to formulate the rules thus 
interpreting the commerce clause in its application . . . .”). 
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Defense Council, Inc.,227 where the statute permits multiple 
interpretations, courts will defer to the interpretation of the 
implementing agency as long as the interpretation is 
reasonable.228 Accordingly, if a tax statute does not require a de 
minimis tax rule, and the agency has decided not to create one, 
courts would tend to defer to the agency’s decision as a 
reasonable exercise of administrative authority. As a result, it 
would be unusual for courts in the tax context to create de 
minimis rules when the agency has not already done so. 
Instead, Treasury is the principal creator of non-statutory 
de minimis tax rules. Treasury does so by making many 
regulatory de minimis tax rules, such as the SSTB de minimis 
rule.229 However, as it turns out, it is not clear whether Treasury 
has the authority to make such exceptions. 
Judicial doctrine has repeatedly recognized implicit 
administrative authority to create regulatory de minimis 
exceptions. In a seminal case, Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,230 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained, 
Categorical exemptions may also be permissible as an 
exercise of agency power, inherent in most statutory 
schemes, to overlook circumstances that in context may 
fairly be considered de minimis. It is commonplace, of course, 
that the law does not concern itself with trifling matters, and 
this principle has often found application in the 
administrative context.231 
Indeed, the Alabama Power court even suggested that the 
administrative authority to create de minimis exceptions “is a 
cousin of the doctrine that, notwithstanding the ‘plain meaning’ 
of a statute, a court must look beyond the words to the purpose 
of the act where its literal terms lead to ‘absurd or futile 
 
 227. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 228. See id. at 843 (“If . . . the court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its 
own construction on the statute . . . . Rather . . . the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”). 
 229. See supra notes 190– 193 and accompanying text. 
 230. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 231. Id. at 360. 
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results.’”232 In support of such ideas, some scholars have 
underscored the role of de minimis authority as part of a 
cost-benefit balancing approach to regulation.233 
Notwithstanding this support for agency authority to create 
de minimis rules, under longstanding judicial doctrine there are 
also clear exceptions to such authority. First, the Alabama 
Power court itself explained that agencies could not create de 
minimis exceptions when the statute itself is “extraordinarily 
rigid,”234 a suggestion that has precluded the ability of agencies 
to create de minimis exceptions in important cases.235 
More significantly for the tax context, courts have explained 
that “de minimis power is strictly limited; an agency can’t use it 
to create an exception where application of the literal terms [of 
the statute] would ‘provide benefits, in the sense of furthering 
the regulatory objectives, but the agency concludes that the 
acknowledged benefits are exceeded by the costs.’”236 In other 
words, an agency cannot create a de minimis rule, even if such 
a rule is justified on cost-benefit grounds, if the rule undermines 
a benefit provided by the statute. As a result, in Waterkeeper 
Alliance v. EPA,237 the D.C. Circuit struck down a regulatory 
exception the EPA had created to statutory reporting 
requirements, even though the EPA had concluded that such 
exception was justified because it “could not foresee a situation 
where the Agency would initiate a response action as a result of 
such notification” and that “federal response is impractical and 
unlikely.”238 
 
 232. Id. at 360 n.89 (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 
U.S. 534, 543 (1940)). 
 233. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. 
L. REV. 1651, 1668– 72 (2001) (exploring de minimis rules as part of a more 
general cost-benefit approach). 
 234. Ala. Power, 636 F.2d at 360. 
 235. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(finding that Congress adopted an “extraordinarily rigid” position in the 
Delaney Clause, which does not allow the FDA to create “an implicit de 
minimis exception for carcinogenic dyes with trivial risks to humans”). 
 236. Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Ala. Power, 636 F.2d at 360– 61). 
 237. 853 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 238. Id. at 535– 36. 
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The fact that agencies do not have authority to create de 
minimis exceptions (or exceptions generally) when literal 
application of the statute would “provide benefits” places in 
doubt Treasury’s authority to create de minimis exceptions in 
regulations. At one level, it is somewhat difficult to map the 
existing judicial authority onto the tax context. Generally, 
judicial analysis of de minimis exceptions has occurred in 
contexts like environmental or health regulation, in which costs 
and benefits of regulation are somewhat apparent: the cost of 
the regulation is typically a quantifiable private compliance 
cost, while the benefit of the regulation is typically a readily 
apparent public benefit, such as improved public health or 
environmental remediation. In some ways, the tax context 
differs from these other regulatory regimes because the benefit 
of the tax law is not as obvious. No lives are saved (at least not 
directly) through improved healthcare or reduced 
environmental contaminants as a result of the tax law.239 
Notwithstanding this difference, however, it is clear that there 
is a public benefit from the tax law, and that public benefit is 
raising revenue.240 
And yet, the de minimis rules Treasury creates in 
regulations often seem to undermine the regulatory benefit of 
revenue raising. Take, as just one example, the de minimis 
exception to the definition of SSTBs in the § 199A regulations. 
As illustrated previously, creating the de minimis exception 
engendered significant reductions in revenue.241 For example, 
under a strict interpretation of the statute with no de minimis 
exception, a business with gross receipts of $100 million, 4.5 
percent of which are attributable to the performance of services 
that would clearly constitute an SSTB under the statute, would 
 
 239. See Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and 
Economics, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 533– 37 (2013) (exploring “Why What’s 
Good for Environmental Law Isn’t Good for Tax”). 
 240. As scholars have noted, the tax law is also used to do other things, 
such as promote certain government policies. See generally David A. Weisbach 
& Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE 
L.J. 955 (2004) (exploring the use of the tax law to conduct non-tax programs 
as a matter of institutional design). To the extent that the tax law is being 
used to do other things in a given instance, the benefit would have to be 
evaluated in terms of these other objectives. 
 241. See supra notes 194– 197 and accompanying text. 
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not have been eligible for the qualified business income 
deduction.242 In contrast, under the de minimis rule adopted by 
Treasury, the entire $100 million of the business’s gross income 
would remain eligible for the qualified business income 
deduction.243 In this case, and other cases in which regulatory 
de minimis tax rules except seemingly insignificant taxpayers 
or transactions from the generally applicable tax law, the de 
minimis tax rules undermine the revenue raising benefit that 
would have been conferred by a strict application of the statute. 
In so doing, they seem to violate the judicial stricture that “an 
agency can’t use [a de minimis rule] to create an exception where 
application of the literal terms would ‘provide benefits, in the 
sense of furthering the regulatory objectives.’”244 
Some might argue that, with the SSTB de minimis rule, 
Treasury was actually defining what is an SSTB, which is 
ambiguous under the statute, rather than exempting taxpayers 
from the generally applicable law under the statute. Under this 
reasoning, Treasury would arguably have the authority to issue 
the de minimis rule, notwithstanding the revenue reduction.245 
In some cases it may be true that a de minimis rule is Treasury’s 
interpretation of the generally applicable law, rather than an 
exception Treasury is putting in place for administrative 
reasons. However, in the case of the SSTB de minimis rule, 
Treasury itself actually justified the de minimis rule as a 
departure from the statute on the basis of administrative 
burdens, not an interpretation of what is an SSTB under the 
statute.246 Such an exception, judicial authority tells us, is 
unjustified if it undermines the benefit of the statute,247 as the 
revenue-reducing SSTB de minimis rule does. 
Others might argue that revenue raising was not the goal 
of the SSTB rule. As a result, Treasury may have been 
 
 242. See supra notes 194– 197 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra notes 194– 197 and accompanying text. 
 244. Waterkeeper, 853 F.3d at 535 (quoting Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 
F.2d 323, 360– 61 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
 245. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (providing the Secretary of the Treasury the 
authority to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations” for enforcement of 
the tax law). 
 246. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
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authorized to create the de minimis exception even to the extent 
it reduced revenue. This is a tough argument to make, however, 
because it was notoriously unclear what the goal of the SSTB 
rule was.248 In the absence of any clear justification, the default 
assumption that the Code is designed to raise revenue makes 
the most sense, and the de minimis rule clearly undermined 
such revenue raising, as already explored. In any event, 
Treasury did not attempt to justify the de minimis rule as being 
consistent with the overall goal of the SSTB rules.249 
Of course, Treasury often has good justifications for making 
regulatory de minimis tax rules. These justifications are 
generally a sense that, even if strict application of the tax law 
would raise revenue, it simply is not worth the effort in a given 
context. Strict application may require too much of the agency’s 
own enforcement resources, or the problem may be that the 
compliance costs would be too high for taxpayers, or some 
combination of these concerns. Indeed, as alluded to previously, 
Treasury justified the § 199A de minimis rule on just these 
bases.250 
However, judicial doctrine is clear that costliness of 
enforcing the statute will have little power to justify a de 
minimis rule when strict application of the statute would 
produce regulatory benefits.251 For this reason, the Waterkeeper 
court required strict application of statutory reporting 
requirements even when the EPA concluded that “federal 
response [to such reporting] is impractical and unlikely.”252 
Likewise, other courts have similarly concluded that agencies 
may not create de minimis exceptions when there are benefits 
engendered by strict application of the statute, even if costs 
outweigh benefits.253 As applied in the tax context, for example, 
Treasury should presumably not be entitled to create a de 
 
 248. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 252. Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 253. See, e.g., Env’t Def. Fund v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(“It is not sufficient that the agency may believe that the costs outweigh the 
benefits, for Congress has already made the judgment that the benefits of 
regulation are sufficient.”). 
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minimis rule on its own that raises the reporting requirements 
for independent contractors, even if the IRS would never audit 
taxpayers below a much higher threshold amount than $600. 
Likewise, Treasury would seem not to have the authority to 
eliminate from the definition of an SSTB a business that would 
qualify, simply because it would be too burdensome for Treasury 
and taxpayers to be subject to the rule. 
To be sure, some courts, including the Alabama Power 
court, have indicated that, separate from de minimis authority, 
“[c]onsiderations of administrative necessity may be a basis for 
finding implied authority for an administrative approach not 
explicitly provided in the statute.”254 As a result, for instance, 
“[c]ourts frequently uphold streamlined agency approaches or 
procedures where the conventional course, typically 
case-by-case determinations, would, as a practical matter, 
prevent the agency from carrying out the mission assigned to it 
by Congress.”255 However, the agency’s burden of justifying such 
an approach is “especially heavy” when, as with de minimis 
exceptions in tax regulations, the exception prospectively 
excuses a group of transactions or taxpayers from statutory 
application.256 Thus, while administrative necessity may, in 
some cases, justify certain de minimis tax rules, it would be an 
uphill battle for Treasury to claim authority to create such rules 
prospectively in regulations. In any event, Treasury is not 
routinely providing any sort of justifications that attempts to 
meet such “especially heavy” burdens. 
IV.  LESSONS FOR THE DESIGN OF DE MINIMIS TAX RULES 
As illustrated in the prior Parts, de minimis rules play a 
pervasive and important role in the tax system. However, they 
are subject to a number of underappreciated problems that 
threaten their efficacy and legitimacy. This does not mean that 
de minimis tax rules should be abandoned. Rather, they should 
be put in place only when policymakers determine that their 
benefits outweigh their costs and that they are preferable over 
 
 254. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 359. 
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less formal administrative discretion. They should also be 
designed with the lessons from this Article in mind. 
A.  Cost-Benefit Analysis Generally 
De minimis tax rules should be the product of a careful 
weighing of costs and benefits. Even without considering some 
of the unintended costs of de minimis tax rules (such as 
inequities for taxpayers left subject to the generally applicable 
tax law), excepting certain taxpayers or transactions from the 
tax law reduces revenue. As a result, at a minimum, the 
reduction in taxpayer compliance costs and government 
enforcement costs from de minimis tax rules should outweigh 
the reduction in tax revenue. At present, not all de minimis tax 
rules reflect such an analysis. 
As an example, consider the de minimis rule that excepts 
certain “small” businesses from having to report on the accrual 
method, which was originally defined by a threshold of $5 
million of gross receipts.257 The legislative history to § 448, 
enacted in 1986, describes the small business exception as 
follows: 
The Congress believed that small businesses should be 
allowed to continue to use the cash method of accounting in 
order to avoid the high costs of compliance which will result 
if they are forced to change from the cash method.258 
In other words, Congress carved out a business size 
threshold ($5 million) under which it believed the compliance 
costs did not merit the more complex rules for accrual method 
accounting. Over thirty years later, Congress expanded the de 
minimis threshold to $25 million as part of the TCJA.259 This 
fivefold increase of the de minimis threshold far exceeds what 
an increase based on an inflation adjustment would have 
 
 257. See supra notes 118– 121 and accompanying text. 
 258. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 99th CONG. GENERAL EXPLANATION 
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 475 (Comm. Print 1987). 
 259. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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been.260 Additionally, the TCJA legislative history does not 
indicate that the expansion of the threshold was due to any 
increase in costs or complexity in the accrual method of 
accounting for taxpayers over time.261 The TCJA expansion thus 
took a de minimis rule originally justified by cost-benefit 
analysis and expanded its scope with no clear justification, other 
than to benefit affected businesses. 
As a broader design point, when considering de minimis 
exceptions, policymakers should look for a clearly favorable 
tradeoff between compliance and administrative savings from 
the rule, relative to the resulting revenue loss. Taxpayer claims 
that a tax rule is burdensome should not automatically give way 
to a de minimis rule; all taxes create “burdens” by design. The 
regulatory de minimis exception for SSTBs in the wake of the 
TCJA serves as another example of when such a cost-benefit 
analysis did not appear to happen; rather, industries simply 
(and successfully) claimed the law would harm them to avoid 
application of the SSTB limitations.262 
In addition to a general cost-benefit analysis of all de 
minimis tax rules, policymakers should use more granular 
cost-benefit analysis to determine what type of de minimis rule 
might make sense in a given context. First, the size of a de 
minimis threshold should correspond to the complexity of the 
underlying tax rule. As discussed above, a relatively small de 
minimis threshold for reporting and paying self-employment tax 
($400) might sensibly reflect the fact that reporting 
self-employment taxes is not a significant burden.263 More 
complicated regimes justify larger exemptions. Along similar 
lines, although exemptions should be adjusted to account for 
inflation or other increasing costs, de minimis thresholds 
shouldn’t otherwise be raised without justification. 
 
 260. Five million dollars in 1986 would be worth roughly $11.5 million in 
2019. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://perma.cc
/37X2-L5PJ (calculated from January 1986 to January 2019). 
 261. The Joint Committee explanation merely states: “The provision 
expands the universe of taxpayers that may use the cash method of 
accounting.” STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF 
PUBLIC LAW 115-97, at 112 (Comm. Print 2018). 
 262. See supra notes 198– 201 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra Part II.B.1. 
DE MINIMIS TAX RULES 833 
 
Second, the cost of applying the de minimis threshold 
should be taken into account in weighing the benefits of a de 
minimis rule. Some rules impose clear de minimis 
thresholds— for example, the $15,000 de minimis threshold for 
gift tax.264 But other de minimis rules are more complicated to 
apply— for example, the regulatory de minimis rule for 
determining SSTB status under § 199A.265 Recall that the rule 
allows taxpayers to avoid SSTB classification if less than 10 
percent (5 percent for larger businesses) of their gross receipts 
are attributable to services that constitute an SSTB.266 This rule 
requires businesses to understand the very complicated rules 
about which business segments may constitute SSTBs, even if 
they meet the de minimis exception. Moreover, as alluded to 
previously, businesses still have to carefully monitor their 
receipts to see if they qualify for the exception.267 If taxpayers 
have to incur costs to monitor their compliance with a de 
minimis threshold, this runs directly counter to the benefits 
conferred by de minimis rules. De minimis thresholds like these, 
which do little to alleviate compliance costs and may even 
increase them, should be viewed as suspect and subject to 
particularly careful cost-benefit analysis. 
In contrast, policymakers should generally strive for de 
minimis rules that are easy to apply. This is particularly 
important if the purpose of a de minimis rule is to protect 
unsophisticated parties from complex tax regimes. Consider 
again the de minimis rule for below-market gift loans, which 
exempts small loans from the complicated imputed interest 
rules of § 7872.268 At first, application of the $10,000 threshold 
appears easy to apply; a parent can disregard the imputed rules 
for loans below the threshold. But the statute layers in 
complexities that undercut the threshold’s simplicity. For 
example, the statute states that the $10,000 de minimis rule will 
not apply to loans that are used to purchase income producing 
 
 264. See I.R.C. § 2503 (gift exclusion); id. § 6019 (gift tax return 
requirement); Frequently Asked Questions on Gift Taxes, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., https://perma.cc/B9FT-8534 (last updated Nov. 9, 2020). 
 265. See supra notes 190– 195 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra notes 190–195 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 268. See I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2). 
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property.269 Further complicating the de minimis exception is 
another rule that says the gift loan can actually be up to 
$100,000 without imputed interest, as long as the borrower does 
not have net investment income over $1,000.270 
In isolation, these rules might make sense. However, query 
whether the goal of a de minimis rule for gift loans is thwarted 
by these backstops, at least in some cases. We can imagine, for 
example, a parent gifting a child $10,000 to make a down 
payment on a property, and because the property yields income, 
unwittingly ending up subject to the imputed interest rules. 
Complicated de minimis rules—those with anti-abuse 
measures, for example—are more justifiable when the de 
minimis rules primarily benefit sophisticated parties. However, 
to the extent some complexity is necessary in applying a de 
minimis tax rule, it should be weighed against the overall 
compliance costs saved by having a de minimis exception. 
Third, where possible, de minimis rules should be designed 
to minimize behavioral distortions. If taxpayers alter their 
behavior to avoid application of a tax rule and qualify for a de 
minimis exception, this distortion imposes further costs on the 
tax system. In particular, the use of a “cliff” —a set dollar 
threshold under or over which the rule changes suddenly271 
— should be avoided when taxpayers are likely to change their 
behavior to avoid application of the cliff. In those situations, 
phase-ins/phase-outs may be a better policy choice. For example, 
if taxpayers lose the benefit of a deduction over a certain income 
threshold, the deduction could be reduced gradually for each 
dollar over the income threshold a taxpayer earns, until it 
phases out completely at a certain level. Such a phase out makes 
the marginal cost of exceeding the threshold much lower. 
 
 269. Id. § 7872(c)(2)(B). 
 270. See id. § 7872(d) (listing special rules for gift loans). The rule states 
that, for individual loans not exceeding $100,000, imputed interest will not 
exceed net investment income. Id. However, net investment income of $1000 
or less is treated as zero for purposes of this rule. Id. § 7872(d)(1)(E)(ii). 
 271. See Manoj Viswanathan, The Hidden Costs of Cliff Effects in the 
Internal Revenue Code and Proposals for Change, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 933 
(2016) (explaining that “cliff effects” can cause two similarly situated 
taxpayers to face different liabilities). 
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Legislators seemed to take this cost into account in drafting 
the statutory de minimis exception to § 199A; recall that rule 
imposes a taxable income threshold over which the statute’s 
more complex provisions apply.272 For taxpayers whose income 
is over the de minimis threshold, however, the deduction phases 
out gradually.273 
On the other hand, as some commentators mentioned in 
practical analysis of the 199A regulations, the regulatory de 
minimis rule for SSTBs does create a cliff effect, whereby 
crossing the line into having just a bit more gross receipts from 
SSTB activity would disqualify the business from the § 199A 
deduction entirely.274 This was a consequential design decision 
that may have outsized impacts on taxpayer behavior. Tax 
scholarship offers a robust “efficiency” framework for analyzing 
these very sort of design decisions that impact taxpayer 
behavior, but it was not brought to bear in this case.275 Future 
de minimis tax rules should be created with more cognizance of 
the costs they may create, and a clearer weighing of such costs 
against benefits. 
B.  Comparison with Less Formal Administrative Discretion 
When considering de minimis tax rules, policymakers 
should also compare them with the use of less formalized 
administrative discretion, including policies of nonenforcement 
for insignificant violations. As suggested previously, while de 
minimis tax rules are designed to solve administrative 
problems, they actually somewhat perversely (or at least 
 
 272. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 274. See, e.g., Eric Yauch, Fiscal-Year Passthroughs Get a Break in Final 
199A Rules, 162 TAX NOTES 547, 547 (2019) (detailing Treasury’s 
acknowledgement of cliff effect as well as resulting concern and planning ideas 
by taxpayers). 
 275. For one canonical article describing the application of efficiency 
analysis to tax law, see generally David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, 
and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999). Joel Slemrod 
has examined in depth the type of “notches” that create cliff effects. See 
generally Joel Slemrod, Buenas Notches: Lines and Notches in Tax System 
Design, 11 EJ. OF TAX RSCH. 259 (2013). 
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unexpectedly) do so by hampering administrative discretion.276 
This results in many of the problems identified previously with 
locking in a permanent solution to a temporary problem.277 For 
instance, when Congress codified the OID rules to alleviate the 
burden of tracking small amounts of hidden interest, Congress 
also foreclosed the role of the tax administrator in developing, 
or changing, administrative solutions as the underlying 
tracking problem changed. While Congress of course could 
revisit the de minimis rules it created, formally enacting de 
minimis rules creates substantial barriers to flexible policy 
changes over time. 
In contrast, similar decisions can be made through less 
formal administrative guidance. For instance, there is no fringe 
benefit rule under § 132 or elsewhere that excludes from income 
the free personal use of an employer-provided smartphone.278 
Such a benefit is not contemplated by Treasury Regulations 
under § 132, and does not clearly fit under the statutory 
definition of de minimis fringes, given the potential frequency of 
personal smartphone use.279 Yet the IRS has stated, in informal 
guidance, that it will treat employer-provided cellphones as de 
minimis (and nontaxable) as long as the primary purpose of the 
phone is business use.280 
Given that similar objectives can be achieved through less 
formal enforcement discretion, when should Congress choose to 
enact de minimis rules? When should Treasury do so in 
regulations? Or when should both Congress and Treasury avoid 
formal adoption, in favor of providing more discretion to the 
administrator through less formal policies and procedures? 
As a general matter, formal legislation and regulation have 
some benefits that, while far from perfect, still have some 
advantages over less formal administrative action. The 
regulatory process is supposed to be imbued with procedures, 
 
 276. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 277. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 278. See I.R.C. § 132. 
 279. Id. § 132(e)(1) (“[A]fter taking into account the frequency . . . .”). 
 280. See Tax Treatment of Employer-Provided Cell Phones, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV. (Sept. 19, 2011), https://perma.cc/HU49-9YQQ (“The value of 
the business use of an employer-provided cell phone is excludable from an 
employee’s income . . . .”). 
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like notice and comment, that stand in the stead of some of the 
inherent legitimacy of congressional procedures.281 In theory, at 
least, transparency and participation in the formal legislative 
and regulatory process provide constituents a means of holding 
elected leaders accountable for the law Congress passes and its 
administration by the agency.282 Less formal administrative 
action lacks many of these hallmarks. And, as many barriers as 
there may be to challenging regulations as being in violation of 
a statute,283 it is even harder to challenge tax enforcement 
policy, or, more specifically, administrative decisions not to 
enforce the law.284 Pushing de minimis tax rules into less formal 
enforcement policy thus has downsides, including making it less 
likely that decisions will be subject to judicial review.285 
On the other hand, the stakes of informal enforcement 
policies are likely to be much lower, and possibly less subject to 
 
 281. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: 
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
461, 541–44 (2003) (exploring role of notice-and-comment procedures in 
legitimizing administrative action). 
 282. See, e.g., Clinton G. Wallace, Tax Policy and Our Democracy, 118 
MICH. L. REV. 1233, 1250 (2020) (exploring how transparency is necessary for 
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that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether 
through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed 
to an agency’s absolute discretion. This recognition of the existence 
of discretion is attributable in no small part to the general 
unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse 
enforcement. 
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L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2018) (“As long as a change in enforcement policy is not 
prospective and categorical, it is immune from judicial review.”). 
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industry lobbying. Most informal de minimis rules, like the 
employer-provided mobile phone example, involve the 
nonreporting of relatively small amounts of income. It would be 
highly unlikely, based on precedent at least, for the IRS to 
announce an informal policy exempting multi-million-dollar 
transactions from a tax rule. It would certainly be unusual to 
see an informal nonenforcement policy on the same scale as the 
SSTB de minimis rule lobbied for under the § 199A regulations. 
Thus, it is possible that limiting Treasury’s authority to make 
de minimis rules would actually reduce or eliminate de minimis 
rules that reflect special interests. Moreover, it is important to 
remember that many regulatory de minimis tax rules are not 
easily justified as a matter of administrative authority.286 They 
often reduce revenue in a way that judicial authority suggests 
cannot be justified easily as a matter of avoiding administrative 
cost.287 
All of this suggests the following: Congress and Treasury 
should think hard about whether an announced form of 
administrative discretion would suffice to meet a current 
administrative problem before locking in a more permanent 
administrative solution in the form of a statutory or regulatory 
de minimis rule. It may well be the case that, as a definitional 
matter, Congress believes that a certain subset of taxpayers or 
transactions should not be subject to the generally applicable 
tax law. If that is the case, and Congress wants that decision to 
remain the same over time, Congress may very well want to 
embrace the rule as a de minimis exception in a tax statute. 
Moreover, if Congress does not do so, and Treasury believes that 
interpreting the statute requires such a de minimis exception, it 
would be more legitimate for Treasury to adopt such an 
approach in notice-and-comment regulations, rather than 
through a less formal policy of nonenforcement. However, if 
Congress has not embraced the exception as a definitional 
matter in the statute and Treasury does not feel the statute 
otherwise compels such an exception as a matter of 
interpretation, then Treasury should think hard about when it 
really needs a de minimis tax rule. When pressed for de minimis 
 
 286. See supra Part III.D.2. 
 287. See supra Part III.D.2. 
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tax rules in regulations, Treasury’s default approach should not 
be to grant such rules whenever they would make 
administration easier. As judicial authority has indicated, when 
strict application of the statute would result in greater revenue 
raising, it should only be the exceptional administrative burden 
or very little revenue at stake that convinces Treasury that a de 
minimis tax rule is actually justified in a regulation.288 And, as 
a matter of administrative flexibility, if the de minimis rule is 
addressing a current, administrative problem, informal 
discretion may be preferable, to allow the agency to revisit the 
problem as it changes over time. The agency can announce its 
nonenforcement policy, thereby salvaging at least some of the 
transparency that would otherwise be lost by moving from a de 
minimis rule to nonenforcement.289 
C.  Design Considerations 
Finally, when Congress or Treasury decides that the 
cost-benefit analysis points in favor of de minimis rules, such 
rules should be designed with the lessons of this Article in mind. 
In particular, three such design principles are highlighted 
below: De minimis tax rules that benefit sophisticated parties 
should be subject to particularly high scrutiny, de minimis rules 
that rely on dollar thresholds should be periodically adjusted, 
and policymakers should consider how to more carefully tailor 
procedural de minimis tax rules to reduce the impact on 
substantive law. 
1.  De Minimis Tax Rules that Benefit Sophisticated Parties 
Should Be Subject to Particularly High Scrutiny 
First, any de minimis tax rule aimed at sophisticated 
parties should be subject to extra scrutiny. As discussed in Part 
II, de minimis rules serve a variety of functions, with many such 
rules protecting smaller and/or less sophisticated parties from 
complicated tax schemes. In this way, de minimis rules sort 
different types of taxpayers into different tax regimes. The 
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justification for de minimis tax rules that primarily benefit 
sophisticated parties is not always readily apparent, as 
presumably these are the very taxpayers more complex tax 
schemes are intended to capture. 
However, even for sophisticated parties, policymakers may 
choose to carve out (relatively) modest transactions where the 
compliance costs associated with a particular tax scheme cannot 
be justified by the revenue. This can be seen in rules like the 
fifteen-day de minimis exception for reporting vacation homes 
or the built-in loss rules under § 382, as well as the de minimis 
exceptions for REITs.290 Although such rules are not justified by 
the parties being unfairly subjected to an overly complex regime, 
they may very well be justified by the tradeoff of tax revenue for 
compliance costs and IRS enforcement costs. 
However, there are particular risks associated with de 
minimis rules in the context of sophisticated transactions. One, 
which we have highlighted above, is that sophisticated parties 
are more likely to lobby for favorable de minimis rules that may 
not be justified on cost-benefit grounds.291 These parties have 
the resources to engage in this lobbying and more at stake in 
securing the protection of a de minimis rule. Further, describing 
a special benefit as a “de minimis rule” may be a low salience 
way for sophisticated players to gain tax benefits that are 
unjustified by general cost-benefit tradeoffs. Again, the 
cost-benefit tradeoff should be a tradeoff between tax revenue 
lost by the de minimis rule and compliance and enforcement 
costs saved, not the tax liability savings to the taxpayer. As 
stated above, all tax rules impose burdens and will impose costs 
on taxpayers. The regulatory process leading to the SSTB de 
minimis rule serves as a stark example of how sophisticated 
parties may use the term “de minimis” to simply avoid 
application of an unfavorable rule.292 Going forward, 
policymakers would be wise to require a detailed cost-benefit 
analysis before creating de minimis rules that benefit 
sophisticated parties. 
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 292. See supra Part III.C. 
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2.  De Minimis Rules that Rely on Dollar Thresholds Should 
Be Periodically Adjusted 
Next, as we have highlighted throughout this Article, many 
de minimis tax rules rely on a dollar threshold to define the 
taxpayer or transaction that is small enough to be considered de 
minimis.293 However, as discussed above, what constitutes 
“small” is likely to change over time due to inflation and/or other 
factors. The $600 threshold for issuing a Form 1099-MISC is a 
perfect example of a de minimis rule that has never been 
indexed and arguably should be adjusted.294 
One obvious way to make adjustments to de minimis tax 
rules is to write into the original rule that the threshold will be 
indexed for inflation. Many, but not all, de minimis thresholds 
do this; and there appears to be no rhyme or reason as to why 
some are indexed and others are not. For example, the threshold 
for reporting and paying household employment taxes 
(currently $2,200) is indexed for inflation,295 as is the gift tax 
threshold.296 However, the threshold for reporting and paying 
self-employment tax ($400) is not;297 arguably this threshold 
could now be much higher. 
Many, perhaps most, de minimis thresholds related to more 
complex rules are also not indexed for inflation. For example, 
the $10,000 de minimis thresholds for both below-market loans 
and OID have been in place for decades without adjustment.298 
A notable exception is the statutory de minimis threshold for 
application of § 199A. The complex provisions in § 199A relating 
to wages and depreciable property apply only to taxpayers over 
a taxable income threshold, which is indexed annually for 
inflation.299 
Indexing all dollar thresholds for inflation would mean each 
rule maintained the scope originally intended by Congress, at 
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least in dollar terms, over many years. But there are tradeoffs 
to consider when indexing de minimis rules. One is complexity—
a de minimis rule that does not change is simpler than a rule 
that does. Making the inflation adjustment itself is relatively 
simple; the tax law does this in numerous places and Treasury 
simply relies on a preset inflation index to do so.300 However, 
changing thresholds may make it harder for taxpayers to plan 
as they have to keep track of a moving target. A taxpayer may 
also inadvertently fall subject to the non-de minimis regime by 
failing to keep track of the moving threshold. For example, we 
can imagine a taxpayer might have heard at some point that the 
gift tax threshold was $14,000, and not realize that in a later 
year the threshold is $15,000. 
Another consideration is that the compliance costs that de 
minimis thresholds are designed to avoid may also change over 
time. In particular, technological advancements may make 
certain procedural compliance requirements—like issuing tax 
forms—significantly easier and cheaper. This makes the 
desirability of raising de minimis thresholds uncertain. 
Returning to the example of the $600 threshold for Form 1099, 
it is clear that the threshold captures transactions that are 
much “smaller” in real dollar terms than Congress intended in 
1954.301 If compliance costs were unchanged since then, this 
would likely be a bad result. If Congress deemed the revenue at 
stake for a $599 transaction unworthy of the compliance costs 
related to a Form 1099, then the revenue at stake for a $600 
transaction today would clearly not justify those compliance 
costs. 
However, it is likely far easier to issue a Form 1099 to a 
payee in the twenty-first century than it was in the 1950s when 
Congress enacted the $600 de minimis rule. Forms can be 
distributed to taxpayers electronically, and payroll software can 
make IRS filings on a relatively low-cost basis.302 With much 
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lower compliance costs, a threshold that had been indexed 
annually for inflation since 1954 may be too high. 
How should policymakers account for this uncertainty? One 
response may be to vary the adjustment to a de minimis rule 
according to the type of complexity the rule was intended to 
address. De minimis rules that exempt taxpayers from complex 
substantive tax rules are rules where periodic adjustments 
probably make sense, because the procedural cost of applying 
the tax law is less relevant to the calculus, but the threshold for 
what is a small taxpayer or transaction will naturally go up in 
tandem with inflation. Yet, ironically, these rules appear to be 
the least often adjusted. For example, if the purpose of a $10,000 
de minimis rule for below-market loans is to exempt small loans 
from the complicated below-market loan rules, that threshold 
should be indexed. Today, a relatively small $11,000 
intra-family loan would no longer fall below the threshold, and 
the imputed interest rules are no easier to understand today 
than when they were when enacted. On the other hand, 
adjustments to procedural de minimis rules—rules that protect 
taxpayers from administrative compliance burdens rather than 
complex substantive rules—should be subject to closer review, 
rather than just relying on a default indexing approach. Because 
compliance burdens may go down over time (particularly as 
technology evolves), inflation indexing or other adjustments 
may be unnecessary, or may not need to happen frequently. 
Another way to deal with uncertainty regarding how to 
adjust de minimis thresholds is to require periodic revisiting of 
the threshold without automatic annual inflation adjustments. 
For example, Congress could write a rule that requires Treasury 
to adjust the Form 1099-MISC threshold every five years, 
without specifically tying it to inflation.303 That would allow a 
more nuanced weighing of inflation versus changing compliance 
costs. Less frequent adjustments may also make it easier for 
taxpayers to assess what the law is at a given time. A downside 
of this approach, however, is giving Treasury discretion for how 
to adjust thresholds will inevitably lead to lobbying for lower 
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thresholds, an approach that mechanical inflation adjustments 
avoid. 
3.  Policymakers Should More Carefully Tailor Procedural De 
Minimis Tax Rules to Reduce the Impact on Substantive Law 
Finally, policymakers should more carefully construct 
procedural de minimis tax rules to target costs, while 
minimizing impacts on substantive tax law. As discussed 
previously, taxpayers often confuse procedural de minimis tax 
rules with a change in the underlying tax law.304 Many other 
taxpayers, who are aware of the distinction, simply use the lack 
of a filing requirement as a reason to cheat, knowing that there 
will be no paper trail of the unreported income.305 This yields 
inequity in addition to lack of transparency about the true 
obligations imposed by the tax law. 
One alternative would be for policymakers to instead enact 
substantive changes to the tax law. For instance, instead of a 
rule that alleviated a Form 1099-MISC requirement for 
payments below $600, the underlying tax law could provide that 
payments to independent contractors below $600 are not income 
at all. This would make the tax law more consistent with 
underlying expectations by taxpayers who are otherwise 
confused and would alleviate some of the inequities that 
currently favor taxpayers who use the lack of information 
reporting as an opportunity to cheat. 
However, such changes would present many of their own 
problems. While getting a payment that falls below the 
reporting threshold is currently advantageous to taxpayers 
because it provides enhanced opportunities to cheat, actually 
changing the underlying tax law would create significant 
behavioral distortions. The new substantive law would heighten 
the value of receiving consecutive payments that fall below the 
threshold, or of being an independent contractor who was 
potentially eligible for the exclusion. This would incentivize 
taxpayers to engage in all sorts of inefficient planning to ensure 
that payments are not subject to tax. It would also put more 
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pressure on the distinction between independent contractors 
and employees (the latter of whom would not be eligible for the 
exclusion), in a way that is somewhat nonsensical and, in any 
event, would be difficult to police given the blurry line between 
the two.306 Similar issues would apply in other contexts if 
procedural de minimis tax rules were replaced with substantive 
exemptions, resulting in great, overall revenue and efficiency 
costs to the tax system. 
Nonetheless, without a wholesale switch to substantive tax 
law exemptions, policymakers can still craft many procedural de 
minimis tax rules to reduce inordinate costs in a more targeted 
way. For instance, in order to file a Form 1099-MISC, payors 
must fill out multiple copies of the form, including many details 
such as the social security or employer identification number of 
the payee.307 The payor must then transmit these forms to 
multiple parties, including to the payee and the IRS.308 And the 
payor must also file a Form 1096 with the IRS that summarizes 
the various information returns submitted by the payor in the 
year.309 The steps involved are onerous for taxpayers making an 
isolated number of small payments, hence the de minimis 
threshold. 
However, rather than eliminating any filing requirement at 
all, policymakers could instead consider making the 
requirements easier for small payments. As one possibility, the 
IRS might provide on its website a printable sheet of paper that 
says, “You received an independent contractor payment that is 
less than $600. This is taxable and will be reported by the payor 
to the IRS. Failure to report and pay tax on the payment on your 
own tax return is tax fraud and is punishable by the IRS.” 
Payors who make payments below the de minimis threshold 
could be required to provide this printable statement to the 
payee, and to report the payment on a Form 1096, along with 
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other payments that the payor made in that year. Or, if the 
payor makes no other reportable payments that year, the payor 
could be required to report the payment on her annual income 
tax return, rather than having any separate filing requirement 
just for the payment. Eliminating additional steps, such as 
filling out and appropriately distributing multiple copies of the 
1099, should reduce many payors’ costs of providing the 
information to payees and the IRS, while still notifying the 
payees that tax liability is owed and providing the IRS some 
information to track the payment. 
Of course, there are costs to this alternative system. For 
one, having different filing requirements for payments below the 
$600 threshold makes the overall system more complex. On the 
other hand, there are already different regimes for payments 
below the threshold, relative to payments at or exceeding the 
threshold amount. The proposed solution, or a different 
alternative regime, may better achieve burden reduction while 
being more mindful of potential impact on substantive tax law. 
While policymakers will want to carefully consider tradeoffs in 
devising particular solutions, they should at the least be more 
cognizant of how, at present, procedural de minimis tax rules 
create de facto substantive tax law. In this, and the many other 
ways described above, more careful attention to the role of de 
minimis tax rules can lead to more sensible design. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has set forth a comprehensive analysis of de 
minimis tax rules, which pervade the Code, but which have been 
the subject of little examination. As this Article has revealed, de 
minimis rules can and do play an important role in allocating 
the costs of the tax system. At best, they can except insignificant 
taxpayers and transactions from inordinate burdens. 
But they can also have significant, deleterious effects. In 
some ways, the de minimis rule in the § 199A regulations is a 
glaring example of a de minimis rule gone wrong. It was adopted 
in the regulations, even though Treasury acknowledged the 
exception conflicted with the statute. The de minimis rule likely 
had a significant, negative impact on revenue, thereby 
threatening claims that Treasury had the administrative 
authority to make it. It was adopted as part of an 
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extraordinarily complex legal regime and did little to actually 
reduce the complexity or burden of such regime. Indeed, if 
anything, it actually exacerbated the complexities of the tax law, 
by making it even more important to keep track of and define 
“SSTB” income. Moreover, the rule conferred great advantage 
on certain insider constituencies, who lobbied heavily for it. And 
the drafting of the rule, with a cliff effect, is likely to engender 
significant efficiency costs. 
How did such a flawed de minimis rule come to pass? It is 
possible that it was a badly designed fluke. But this Article 
suggests there is a more problematic story: the very belief that 
de minimis tax rules are insignificant has long enabled insiders 
to lobby for them while others assume that they do not matter 
that much. This can result in significant, and poorly construed, 
giveaways to powerful taxpayers, with little pushback. Even 
when the story is not one of well-organized insiders getting their 
way, policymakers and commentators alike have not thought 
much of de minimis rules one way or the other, leading to 
suboptimal drafting and impacts on the tax system. 
This Article has surveyed the extensive and varied de 
minimis rules throughout the tax system. The Article has 
displayed that collectively, and even individually, they matter, 
no matter how “de minimis” they might seem. Hopefully, this 
Article will help policymakers and commentators think 
carefully about the many de minimis rules that are likely to be 
requested in the future. Paying attention to these seemingly 
small decisions has important, systemwide effects. 
 
